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Introduction
The Draft Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies of July 3, 1979,' is intended to provide a more detailed
regime than now exists for the moon and celestial bodies and their natural
resources. The proposed treaty deals only with these areas and their re-
sources. It does not have application to outer space, per se. The treaty permits
certain forms of conduct. It prohibits other forms of conduct.
The Moon Treaty has been the product of many labors. In the United
States several of its most carefully negotiated provisions have been adversely
criticized. Such criticisms appear to be unfounded.
Its terms, properly understood, will provide a regime supportive of the
1967 Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Explora-
tion and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies.' The Principles Treaty focuses on the exploration, use, and exploita-
tion of the space environment consisting of outer space, per se, the moon,
and celestial bodies. The Moon Treaty, unlike the Principles Treaty, makes
specific provision for the exploitation of the natural resources of the Moon
*Professor of International Law and Political Science, University of Southern California.
'U.N. Doc. A/34/20, 1979. It will be referred to as the Moon Treaty.
218 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205. It entered into force for the United
States on October 10, 1967. It will be referred to as the Principles Treaty. At present it is in force
for over 80 states including all of the space-resource states.
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and celestial bodies. The Moon Treaty, while preserving the provision con-
tained in Article 2 of the Principles Treaty that there may not be a sovereign
appropriation of the moon and celestial bodies, does enable defined juridical
and natural persons to obtain proprietary rights in certain natural resources
on and of the moon and celestial bodies.
The new rights and duties contained in the Moon Treaty have been brought
together through the adoption of the Common Heritage of Mankind (CHM)
principle. Since this principle on its own account has introduced a new ap-
proach to the exploration, use, and exploitation of natural resources, there is
a need to examine its meaning and utility and to compare this principle with
other principles that might have been adopted respecting resource use, ex-
ploitative activities, and proprietary rights concerning natural resources.
Many important values, interests, wants, and needs, require evaluation in
order to comprehend the legal significance and evolving range of application
of the CHM principle.
The Moon Treaty necessitates the making of distinctions between at least
four different situations-all of which have factual bases and legal conse-
quences. First, there is the difference to be noted between the spatial area of
the moon and celestial bodies and their natural resources. Second, there is a
difference between the prohibition contained in Article 2 of the Principles
Treaty against national, e.g., sovereign, appropriation of spatial areas and
the right of legal persons to obtain property rights in certain natural re-
sources. Third, the provisions of Articles 1 and 3 in particular of the Princi-
ples Treaty, as well as other articles, allowing for the exploration, use, and
exploitation of the space environment by states must be contrasted with the
rights of other legal persons to engage in such exploration, use, and exploita-
tion. Fourth, there is a need to distinguish the characteristics of the CHM
principle from such other legal principles as res nullius, res communis, and
res communis humanitatis. 3
The substantive provisions of the 1967 Principles Treaty made twenty-five
references to the moon and other celestial bodies.' Additionally, there were
'The res communis humanitatis concept has been considered by its proponents to be an
augmentation of the res communis principle as it related to the moon and other celestial bodies.
A function of the concept was to "avoid the legal vacuum of non-appropriation, nonproperty,
non-cession, non-exchange, non-lease, non-sale, non-transfer and so forth." A. A. Cocca, The
Principles of the "Common Heritage of all Mankind" as Applied to Natural Resources from
Outer Space and Celestial Bodies, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF
OUTER SPACE, p. 174 (1974). Applying the concept only to the moon and other celestial bodies
Cocca indicated support coming from a congress of international lawyers meeting in Buenos
Aires in 1969. They concluded that the concept was a "legal condition especially elaborated by
law for this new field of human activity, and which is derived from the community of interests
and benefits recognized in favor of mankind in outer space and celestial bodies." Id. Support for
the concept was found to exist in the 1967 Principles Treaty.
'Other outer space treaties binding the United States and the major space-resource states are
the Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and the Return of Objects
Launched into Outer Space, December 3, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570, T.I.A.S. No. 6592, 672 U.N.T.S
119; Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects, October 9,
1973, 24 U.S.T. 2389, T.I.A.S. No. 7762; and Convention on Registration of Objects Launched
into Outer Space, September 15, 1976, T.I.A.S. No. 8480.
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seven separate references to celestial bodies. The treaty made no reference
whatever to the natural resources of the space environment. It was an interna-
tional agreement designed to deal with general principles having application
to the space environment.
Events occurring in the 1960s suggested that a more detailed legal structure
dealing with man's moon and celestial body activity, including use, explora-
tion, and exploitation, might be desirable. Influencing early proposals were
the successful moon landing by the United States in 1969, an awareness that
tangible moon rocks were being returned to earth, the attention being given
by scientists to such materials, the preliminary studies identifying the com-
mercial uses of space materials and facilities, the knowledge that orbital posi-
tions and access to radio spectra were becoming valuable natural resources,
and speculations that it might be possible to establish habitations on the
moon. Even the temporary presence of humans would require the exploita-
tion of available tangible and intangible resources.
The presence of an effective rule of law in the space environment depends
on a wise blending of general principles with a more specific set of rules. The
Principles Treaty fixed legal principles for the free exploration, use, and
exploitation of the space environment as well as assuring free access to that
environment. The 1979 Moon Treaty seeks to formulate a particularized set
of rules and present and future processes whereby the optimum exploration,
use, and exploitation of the moon and its natural resources may take place.
The Moon Treaty contains substantive terms of immense importance to
the well-being of mankind. Among its notable provisions are those making
international law applicable to all activities on the moon-including its ex-
ploration, use, and exploitation, -requiring that the moon shall be used by
all states' parties exclusively for peaceful purposes, providing that the ex-
ploration, use, and exploitation of the moon shall be the province of all
mankind, imposing on states the duty of providing notice concerning moon
activities, providing for nondiscriminatory and free scientific investigation
on the moon, imposing the duty not to disrupt the existing balance of the
moon's natural environment, and affording to astronauts and other persons
on the moon all safeguards respecting their lives and their health. As early as
1972 the negotiators arrived at a consensus that national nongovernmental
entities, e.g., private legal persons-including juridical and natural per-
sons-should engage in moon and celestial body activity "only under the
authority and continuing supervision of the appropriate State Party."'
While many of these principles are already a part of the existing interna-
tional law of the space environment, the 1979 Moon Treaty has given more
detail and substance to such principles.6
'Article 13, Draft Treaty Relating to the Moon, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/101, p. 6, 11 May
1972. This provision was retained in all subsequent drafts and became Article 14 of the Moon
Treaty.
'The early drafts borrowed heavily on provisions contained in the Principles Treaty. V. Kopal,
The Development of Legal Arrangements for the Peaceful Uses of the Moon, PROCEEDINGS OF
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The treaty contains a strikingly new international legal principle. It is the
principle, set out in Article 11, that "The Moon and'its natural resources are
the common heritage of mankind." Because of its importance and relative
novelty this analysis will focus primarily on the meaning of the CHM princi-
ple and what is intended to be gained by its incorporation into the interna-
tional law applicable to the moon and other celestial bodies. Inextricably
linked to natural resources and CHM are concepts of property and an in-
ternational regime, including the prospect of a new international organiza-
tion.
The Moon Treaty, by extending the detailed rule of law to the moon and to
other celestial bodies, will afford stability to governments and to private
enterprise so that worthwhile exploitative activities may be initiated. As early
as 1972 the Legal Subcommittee of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Outer Space (COPUOS) had taken account of "the need for economic ad-
vancement and for the encouragement of investment and efficient develop-
ment" in order to assure that the resources of the Moon and other celestial
bodies would become a reality.'
In the United States it is to be expected that such activities will be carried on
by both the national and other governmental bodies and by private firms.
This would follow, for example, the approach now favored in which both the
national government and private enterprise engage in telecommunication ac-
tivities in the space environment. With the entry into force of the Moon
Treaty both states and private enterprise will be able to make informed plans
relating to the exploitation of the moon and other celestial bodies including
the natural resources of such areas.
The first proposal for an international agreement providing for the de-
tailed governance of the moon and other celestial bodies, including the use of
the CHM principle, came before COPUOS on July 3, 1970, in the form of an
Argentinian "Draft Agreement on the Principles Governing Activities on the
Use of Natural Resources of the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies."' The
Argentinian proponent, Professor A. A. Cocca, has treated the foregoing as
a principle of law and not as a philological question nor equated to the realms
THE 15TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 161 (1973); M. Smirnoff, The Needfor
a Treaty on the Legal Status of the Moon, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 15TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW
OF OUTER SPACE, p. 175 (1973); S. Gorove, The Draft Treaty Relating to the Moon: An Over-
view and Evaluation, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 19TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE,
p. 41 (1977); B. A. Luxenberg, United Nations Draft Treaty on the Moon, in World Wide Space
Activities, SUBCOMM. ON SPACE SCIENCE AND APPLICATIONS, COMM. ON SCIENCE AND TECHNOL-
ooY, U.S. House of Representatives, 95th Cong., Ist Sess., p. 538 (1977).
'U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/101, p. 6, 11 May 1972; U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/196, Annex 1, p. 20,
11 April 1977.
'U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.71 and Corr. 1; U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/85, Annex 2, p. 1, 3
July 1970. Article 1 of the Argentinian Draft Agreement stated: "The natural resources of the
Moon and other celestial bodies shall be the common heritage of mankind." Id.
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of philosophy." It was also his view, which is supported by Article 8 of the
Principles Treaty, that the principles of property law accompanied
mankind's ventures into the space environment.'" From that date to July 3,
1979, the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS gave substantial attention to the
drafting of a Moon Treaty containing provisions going far beyond the fo-
cused approach of the Argentinian draft.
On July 3, 1979, COPUOS, through the established process of consen-
sus-namely, with the approval of all of the members, but without a formal
vote-adopted for submission to the Political Committee and to the General
Assembly a Moon Treaty of twenty-one articles. " In the years between 1972
and 1977, following the request of the Soviet Union on June 4, 1971, to the
General Assembly to include as an agenda item the topic of "Preparation of a
Treaty Concerning the Moon,"'" the Legal Subcommittee considered 27
texts concerning natural resources, 15 relating to the scope of the agreement,
and 19 relating to the time in which states should report information relating
to space activities.' 3 Annual discussions contributed to the slow emergence of
consensus.
On April 3, 1978, Austria submitted to COPUOS a working paper consist-
ing of 21 articles. '4 This document borrowed heavily on earlier drafts. In 1972
the Legal Subcommittee had completed a draft consisting of a preamble and
21 articles that included in square brackets the provision that "[t]he natural
resources of the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be the common heri-
tage of mankind." 5 The same square bracketed provision was contained in
the April 27, 1973, "Draft Treaty Relating to the Moon."' 6
In 1974 Bulgaria submitted a draft, which contained provisions similar to
those that had been formulated in 1973.'7 By 1978 the proposal read: "For
the purposes of this Agreement, the Moon and its natural resources shall be
considered the common heritage of mankind, which finds its expression in
the relevant Agreement and in particular in paragraph 5 of this [11] arti-
cle."" Although there were other areas of disagreement at COPUOS be-
'A. A. Cocca, op. cit., p. 174 (1974).
"Id., p. 173. Compare A. A. Cocca, Legal Status of the Natural Resources of the Moon and
Other Celestial Bodies, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE,
p. 146 (1971). Reference was made in this article to the 1969 initiative of Argentina identifying
the legal status of materials, resources, and products of the moon.
"There are 47 members of COPUOS coming from all of the principal space-resource states,
from many developing countries, from all of the continents, and representing different social-
economic perspectives and ideologies.
"U.N. Doc. A/8391, 4 June 1971. 10 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 839 (July 1971). A draft treaty
of 15 articles entitled "Treaty Concerning the Moon" was attached as an Annex.
'3U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/196, Annex 1, 11 April 1977.
"U.N. Doc. WG.1(1978)/WP.2, 3 April 1978; U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/218, Annex 1, 13 April
1978.
"U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/101, p. 6, 11 May 1972.
"U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/115, 27 April 1973; 1 J. SPACE L., p. 170 (Fall 1973).
"U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/133, p. 5, 6 June 1974.
"U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/218, Annex 1, p. 6, 13 April 1978.
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tween 1973 and 1979 on this subject, the principal obstacle centered around a
provision relating to the exploration and use, including exploitation, of natu-
ral resources. Affecting a consensus disposition of this issue was the distinc-
tion to be drawn between private property and public sovereignty. Influenc-
ing these considerations were the meanings to be attributed to such concepts
as "the province of mankind" and "the common heritage of mankind."
Both have been regarded as important political-legal concepts. To the ex-
tent that they have been incorporated into international space agreements
they can only be treated as legal principles. As legal principles, namely, as
starting points for legal reasoning, several demands have surfaced. One has
been to endeavor to ascertain-as much as it is possible to read the future-
what the substantive content of these legal principles will come to mean when
they are applied in a work-a-day world. The acceptance in treaty form of the
CHM principle will not prevent affected States from attaching different in-
terpretations to its meaning.
The Public Sovereignty-Private Property
Dilemma Relating to Space Resources
With the transition from the exploration of the space environment to its
practical use and exploitation it has become necessary to identify the legality
of exploitative conduct. This is now true respecting the exploitation of the
moon and its natural resources.
Viewed from the perspective of policy choices it would be possible to ac-
cord rights to both the moon and to its natural resources to both natural and
juridical persons. The latter could include states and international bodies,
both intergovernmental, such as the European Space Agency, and private
legal persons endowed with a national character, such as a multinational
corporation. Their respective interests could take into account security, com-
merce, and science, to mention only those that are of relevance here. Thus,
the subject involves the interests of several international actors in both the
moon and its natural resources. The public actors are concerned with their
sovereign and governmental rights and functions. The private actors seek a
clarification of their rights under domestic and international law as they
contemplate exploitative activities. The private actors, no less than the public
actors, are concerned about property rights resulting from their efforts.
During the period since 1960, as progress was made toward the drafting of
the 1979 Moon Treaty, many policy approaches were suggested. These al-
ternatives need to be kept in mind when an effort is made to understand the
conclusion reached in Article 11 of that Treaty that both "the Moon and its
natural resources are the common heritage of mankind. ... ." Numerous
political-legal options were available. Each would have resulted in quali-
tatively different rights and duties for both natural and juridical persons.
The views of international lawyers from many countries have had a sub-
stantial impact on the identification of competing policy choices. Their con-
tributions were weighed by COPUOS and influenced the final decision to
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make the CHM principle a key part of the 1979 Moon Treaty.
Writing in 1962 about the expected exploitability of mineral resources, it
was suggested by Jenks that "[i]t would seem desirable to start from the
principle that title to the natural resources of the Moon and of other planets
and satellites should be regarded as vested in the United Nations and that any
exploitation of such resources which might be possible should be on the basis
of concessions, leases or licenses from the United Nations." 9 Presumably
the holders of such property rights might have been both the sovereign State,
public international organizations, and private legal persons. Alternative le-
gal regimes for the exploration, use, and exploitation of the moon and its
natural resources could include such extremes as the total prohibition of both
public and private space activities or, by contrast, a wholly unregulated
power for public and private persons to engage in such activities. Such legal
controls could take the form of specific authorizations. Or, certain forms of
conduct might have been permitted although not specifically authorized. In
the event of a total absence of international legal controls states would be
allowed to assert unrestricted public sovereignty. Absent a legal regime
private persons would be allowed to claim unrestricted rights, including ex-
clusive uses, which would constitute either property rights or a preferred
status respecting resources. In legal terminology, the legal options would
encompass the concepts or principles of res nullius, res communis, res com-
munis humanitatis, and the Common Heritage of Mankind. Specific conse-
quences would flow from the identification of one as opposed to an alterna-
tive approach. For example, any one of the four would be a denial of the
proposal put forward by Jenks. Any one of the four would have a major
impact on public and private space activity. Depending on which of the op-
tions might be adopted states, intergovernmental organizations, and private
persons would be differently governed in the exploration, use, and exploita-
tion of the area and its resources, including uses taking on an exclusive
character, e.g., having property connotations.
An alternative to the Jenks proposal for U.N. authority was soon put
forward.
In its Draft Declaration of the Basic Principles Governing the Activities of
States Pertaining to the Exploration and Uses of Outer Space of Septem-
ber 10, 1962, the Soviet Union sought to limit the exploration and use of the
space environment to states. Thus, it suggested "7. All activities of any kind
pertaining to the exploration of outer space shall be carried out solely and
exclusively by States .. ."1o One of the relevant principles in the Declara-
"C. W. JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND, p. 398 (1962). Compare Jenks, Seven Stages
in the Development of Space Law, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1 ITH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF
OUTER SPACE, p. 256 (1969).
"U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/L.2; U.N. Doc. A/5181, Annex 3. In a revised draft of April 16,
1963, the proposal read: "7. All activities of any kind pertaining to the exploration and use of
outer space shall be carried out solely by States. If States undertake activities in outer space
collectively, either through international organizations or otherwise, each State participating in
436 INTERNATIONAL LA WYER
tion referred to international responsibility for damage "done to a foreign
State or to its physical or juridical persons as a result of such activities." 2 '
The United States advanced the view on September 11, 1962, that both
states and international organizations would be "responsible for the launch-
ing of a space vehicle .. .2 This position was restated in the U.S. Draft
Declaration of Principles Relating to the Exploration and Use of Outer Space
of December 8, 1962.3 This proposal was put forward in the context of
responsibility for launching and possible liability for damages.
In explaining the import of this proposal the U.S. representative told the
legal Subcommittee of COPUOS on April 24, 1963, that it "covered the
possibility of a Government enlisting the help of a private corporation or
firm, which it might authorize to carry out activities in space subject to con-
tinuing Government supervision." ' It was pointed out that pursuant to U.S.
policy, as reflected in the Communications Satellite Act of 1962, a right had
been established for private firms to engage in space activity and that the
principle of national responsibility for national space activities, both public
and private, had been established. This legislation was intended to reassure
the limited number of states which had expressed the view that international
space activities should be conducted only by states that harms resulting from
both private and public activity would be encompassed by a legal regime.
Thus, in September, 1963, the Soviets withdrew their proposal that space
activity should be carried out only by states. In commenting on the conduct
of activities in space by private firms, under the supervision or control of a
government, it was stated: "The Soviet delegation considers it essential to
point out that in this field it would be possible to consider the question of not
excluding from the declaration the possibility of activity in outer space by
private companies, on the condition that such activity would be subject to the
control of the appropriate State, and the State would bear international re-
sponsibility for it." 2
These outlooks produced paragraph 5 of General Assembly Resolution
1962 (XVIII) of December 13, 1963, which provided that "States bear in-
ternational responsibility for national activities in outer space, whether car-
ried on by governmental agencies or by non-governmental entities, and for
assuring that national activities are carried on in conformity with the princi-
ples set forth in the present Declaration." Although the declaration did not
define "national activities" to include only public activities nor to exclude
private activities carried on by nationals, the distinction drawn between
such activities has a responsibility to comply with the principles set forth in this Declaration."
U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.6.
" Id. I1.
2 U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/L.5; U.N. Doc. A/5181, Annex 3.
23U.N. Doc. A/C.1/881, p. 23, Article 6.
2
'U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.20, p. 12.
"U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.22, p. 37.
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''governmental agencies" and "non-governmental entities" may reasonably
be construed to include private firms within the last mentioned category. This
conclusion was reenforced by the negotiations and terms employed in the
1967 Principles Treaty, particularly Article 6.
Leading to the 1967 Treaty were the 1966 proposals of the Soviet Union
and the United States. On June 16, 1966, the Soviets submitted to the UN
Secretary-General a Draft Treaty on Principles which contained the basic
terms of paragraph 5 of General Assembly Resolution 1962. It accepted the
view that states would bear international responsibility for national activities
in outer space or on celestial bodies "whether such activities are carried on by
governmental agencies or by non-governmental bodies corporate." Further,
such private national legal entities were to be subject to the "authorization
and continuing supervision by the State concerned." '2 6 Pursuant to this lan-
guage Comsat "would be an 'international responsibility' of the U.S. gov-
ernment, which would also be responsible for its 'authorization and continu-
ing supervision.' ,, Although the United States did not have a comparable
provision in its Draft Treaty of May 10, 1966, it did contemplate the presence
of nationals engaging in space activities on the moon, and it did not disavow
its early support of private activities or the favored terms of paragraph 5 of
General Assembly Resolution 1962.28
Both states were also in agreement that the moon, per se, was not to be
"subject to national appropriation by claim of sovereignty, by means of use
or occupation, or by any other means." This formulation became Article 2 of
the 1967 Principles Treaty, reading, "Outer space, including the Moon and
other celestial bodies, is not subject to national appropriation by claim of
sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means. ' ' 9 This
was intended to, and did, constitute a prohibition against the presence of
national or public sovereignty respecting the spatial area of the moon. By its
language it did not deal with natural resources. It did not deal with private
activities. It prohibited national sovereignty. In establishing this principle the
negotiators borrowed from Article 4 of the 1959 Antarctica Treaty which
prohibited national sovereignty in that area. The res communis principle,
according to Ambassador Goldberg, resulted from "an attempt to create in
outer space the closest analogy and that is the high seas." 3 He stated that the
treaty allowed no national appropriation, and "forbids claims of sov-
ereignty." 3
"U.N. Doc., A/6352, 16 June 1966.
"SPACE TREATY PROPOSALS BY THE UNITED STATES AND U.S.S.R., STAFF REPORT, COMM. ON
AERONAUTICAL AND SPACE SCIENCES, U.S. SENATE 89TH CONG., 2D SESS., p. 23 (1966).
"U.N. Doc. A/6327.
"18 U.S.T. 2410, T.I.A.S. No. 6347, 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
"Treaty on Outer Space, Hearings before the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate,
90th Cong., 1st Sess., Executive D, p. 63 (1967).
"Id. at 148. Secretary of State Rusk emphasized that Article 2 of the 1967 Treaty prohibited
"national appropriation..."and that this provision reinforced the "free-access provisions" of
Article 1. Id. at 110.
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Article 6 of the 1967 Principles Treaty contemplated that space activities
relating to the moon would be "carried on by governmental agencies or by
non-governmental entities," with the latter to be subject to the "authoriza-
tion and continuing supervision by the appropriate State Party to the
Treaty." That this language was understood as allowing states to authorize
private, as well as governmental, activities in the space environment was
made clear in the testimony of Ambassador Goldberg before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations. In explaining the meaning of Article 6
Senator Fulbright observed: "You mean by activities, either by Government
or some nongovernmental entity. Do you contemplate private enterprise un-
dertaking development in outer space?" 3 The former responded: "Yes, this
might happen, and if it does, then the Government must bear responsibility
for nongovernmental organizations. Comsat, organizations of that type." 3 3
The foregoing history demonstrates the presence of an international legal
regime in which outer space, per se, and the moon and celestial bodies are not
subject to national appropriation and consequently there is the absence of
public sovereignty in the indicated areas. This constituted a rejection of the
res nullius option and the acceptance of the res communis principle. Flowing
from this principle, which had found expression in the law of the high seas,
was the right of states, international organizations, and private legal persons
to engage in activities in and to make use of the space environment. Since
states could not exercise the prerogatives of sovereignty they could not estab-
lish property rights, in the sense of exclusive authority, over the indicated
spatial areas for themselves, nor could they grant such property rights to
those who were subject to their national laws. However, with the decision as
set forth in the 1967 Principles Treaty to allow for the free use, exploration,
and exploitation of the space environment, including free access thereto,
states, international organizations, and juridical and natural persons, includ-
ing private legal persons, were enabled to exploit the space environment and
obtain private property rights in its natural resources.3 ' Juridical and natural
persons while engaged in such activities pursuant to the authority of a state
would be under the control of that state. Parties to the 1967 Treaty are re-
sponsible for the conduct of such authorized persons.
21d. at 27.
33Id.
"It has been pointed out that Article 2 of the 1967 Principles Treaty did not alter the terms of
paragraph 3 of General Assembly Resolution 1962 in which the prohibition of national appro-
priation applied to outer space, the moon, and celestial bodies rather than to their resources,
even though the treaty "remains silent concerning the exploitation of space resources." C. W.
Jenks, Property in Moon Samples and Things Left upon the Moon, 12TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE
LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 148 (1970). Jenks also observed that the ownership of moon samples
"vests in the government of the United States through the action of its agents in reducing into
possession..." such samples. There would not be "any transfer of property" by the United
States in voluntarily making such samples available to other states for their scientific investiga-
tions. Id. at 149.
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The foregoing result was not preordained. Early discussions which oc-
curred prior to the Argentinian draft Agreement of July 3, 1970, raised the
issues of public and private property rights concerning both the moon and its
natural resources. Beginning in 1960 the International Institute of Space
Law, a private group of international lawyers expert in the field of space law,
established a working group on celestial bodies. In 1964 the working group
put forward a draft resolution that provided in paragraph 3 that celestial
bodies "or regions of them shall not be subject to national or private appro-
priation." 5 While there was support for this proposition at that time, includ-
ing the reference to private appropriation, with a growing awareness of
man's ability to have access to the space environment and his needs to make
use of its resources there has emerged an unwillingness by states to impose
arbitrary legal constraints on either public or private access and use, explora-
tion, and exploitation.
Nonetheless, M. Smirnoff of Yugoslavia in his role as chairman of the
Institute's working group on the moon submitted a proposal in 1966 which
included the provision that celestial bodies "shall not be subject to national
or private appropriation by claims of sovereignty, by means of use, or by any
other means." '36 The proposal also indicated that nongovernmental entities
''may explore and use" celestial bodies with the permission of the parent
state." Thus, the critical distinction was made between the nonestablishment
of private property rights in the form of appropriation, e.g., exclusive use,
and the private right to engage in nonexclusive uses in the process of explora-
tion. But, this distinction was made regarding the celestial bodies, per se, and
not with regard to their natural resources. In 1967, Article 2 of the Principles
Treaty deleted the term "private" from its limitation on the means of effect-
ing appropriation of outer space, the moon, and celestial bodies. At this early
stage groups of experts were suggesting that private property rights should
not appertain solely to the indicated spatial areas.
Following the September, 1963, withdrawal by the Soviet Union of its
opposition to private space activity, Soviet participants in the Institute's
meetings nonetheless sought to urge a restrictive meaning for Article 2 of the
"PROCEEDINGS OF THE 8TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 468 (1966). The
Institute has given much attention to the establishment of a legal regime for the moon and
celestial bodies and their natural resources. See the PROCEEDINGS OF THE 9TH COLLOQUIUM, pp. 8-
65 (1967); the 10th Colloquium, pp. 10-63 (1968), as well as contributions in the subsequent
colloquia. For example, the question was asked by C. E. S. Horsford, "What rights accrue as to
minerals and other natural resources, and does 'use' include the right to take things from a
celestial body?" Legal Problems Relating to the Establishment of a Station with Personnel on
the Moon, Introductory Report, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 10TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER
SPACE, p. 11 (1968). The opinions of the scholars meeting at the annual sessions of the Interna-
tional Institute of Space Law have contributed materially to the present substantive law of the
moon and its natural resources.
"PROCEEDINGS OF THE 10TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 13 (1968).
37Id.
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Principles Treaty. Thus, in 1968 G. P. Zhukov stated that this article "pre-
cludes any possibility of outer space, including the Moon and other celestial
bodies, being appropriated by states, private persons or companies." 38 How-
ever, he forecast the need for states to engage in "coordinated efforts" re-
garding the "exploitation of minerals." 39 In the view of one observer the
prohibition against national sovereignty respecting the moon would result in
a condition in which "nobody-whether a private person or a public body-
can acquire the title to exploit its surface or its soil." '
E. Brooks, on the other hand, suggested that there was no need to deter-
mine if the prohibition against the presence of national sovereignty would
inhibit exploitative activities on the moon. In his view the "economic in-
terests of States, private companies and individuals can be as well accommo-
dated by an international organization as they can by the exercise of property
rights on a national basis, violative of the nonappropriation clause" of Arti-
cle 2 of the Principles Treaty.4 '
Zhukov in 1967, while unwilling to accept the position that private legal
persons could engage in the exploitation of the natural resources of the
Moon, observed that "Each state will have the right to use the natural re-
sources of the Moon."' This outlook was favored in 1976 by Reijnen, who,
however, has advanced the thought that states could only use such natural
resources on the moon. Support for this "exclusivity" proposal was based on
the view that natural resources could not be appropriated under the terms of
Article 2 of the Principles Treaty.' 3 In searching for a legal doctrine upon
which to rest this policy outlook Zhukov favored the acceptance of the anal-
ogy of "exploitation by a maritime state of the natural wealths on and under
the surface of the continental shelf.'" He rejected the analogy founded in
the res communis principle of freedom of fishing on the high seas. He
stated: "If a state proceeds to the mining of natural resources on a certain
"JG. P. Zhukov, Tendencies and Prospects of the Development of Space Law, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE 11TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 277 (1969).
"Id. at 279.
11R. Mankiewicz, Intervention with Respect to Permanent Stations on the Moon, PROCEED-
INGS OF THE I ITH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 163 (1969). In his view the
absence of sovereignty would prevent both public and private entities from engaging in the
exploitation of the resources on the Moon, since such activity would "constitute appropriation
of things which cannot be appropriated and for which, therefore, no legal title can be acquired."
Id.
"E. Brooks, Control and Use of Planetary Resources, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1 ITH COLLOQUIUM
ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 348 (1969). He assumed that in such an international body the
space-resource states would possess enough influence to be able to receive a commensurate share
of benefits.
4'G. P. Zhukov, The Problem of Legal Status of Scientific Research Station on the Moon,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 1OTH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 61 (1968).
'G. C. M. Reijnen, The History of theDraft Treaty on the Moon, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 19TH
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 366 (1977). However, Article 2 only prohibits
appropriation of the space environment, per se, not its natural resources.
"Zhukov, op. cit., p. 61.
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section of the Moon, and for that purpose erects there all the required instal-
lations and structures, it would be necessary to recognize the right of that
state to the exceptional use of that section, like it has done with regard to the
exceptional right of a maritime state to use the natural resources of the con-
tinental shelf."" In supporting the view that the continental shelf principle
should apply to the development of natural resources at a given position on
the moon, he concluded that this would allow a state to "preserve the right to
use exclusively this section . .. -6
It was the view of Zhukov that since states would be able to serve their
economic interests through the exclusive use and exploitation of the natural
resources of areas of the moon there was no need to extend the principle of
national sovereignty, with its collateral right of national appropriation, to
the natural resources, per se. With the adoption of Article 6 of the 1967
Principles Treaty allowing for nongovernmental activities to take place in the
space environment, exploitative activities were not limited to states. But,
since the Principles Treaty was a statement of general principles, it was still
necessary to determine whether the views of Zhukov that the exclusive na-
tional right to exploit natural resources should be considered to be a property
right, and whether more explicit language than exists in Article 6 of the Prin-
ciples Treaty, would be required to allow private firms to engage in the use
and exploitation of the natural resources of the moon. There was a further
need to determine if Zhukov's proposal that a state could be economically
dominant in a given section of the moon could stand the test of the prohibi-
tions contained in Article 2 of the Principles Treaty.
Writing in 1966, E. Fasan raised the question of whether there could be an
appropriation by a state of a part of a celestial body when national appropria-
tion of the entire body was prohibited." He called for the need to draw a very
clear line between the prohibition of sovereign appropriation of a celestial
body and the right to use such a body. He noticed that natural resources, such
as mineral deposits, on a celestial body would be exploited both by States and
private persons. In his view such natural resources "may belong to the indi-
vidual or the nation that discovers or develops them."" 8
Following the completion of the Principles Treaty, and in the light of the
foregoing views, it became necessary to identify the relationship between
45Id.
"G. P. Zhukov, Moon for All States, SPACE WORLD, p. 45 (July 1968). The continental shelf
analogy has been rejected. E. Brooks, op. cit., p. 348. Brooks also opposed the view that a state
may assert a claim to a section of the moon in order to put forward a claim for exclusive uses of
planetary resources. Id. at 341.
'E. Fasan, Legal Problems for Celestial Bodies and their Solution, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 9TH
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 54 (1967).
4'id. Compare F. G. Rusconi, The Legal Status of Heavenly Bodies, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 9TH
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 62 (1967); see also C. E. S. Horsford, The Need
for a Moon Treaty and Clarification of the Legal Status of Space Vehicles, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
9TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 48 (1967).
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Article 1 and other articles calling for the free exploration and use of the
space environment and Article 2 denying national appropriation of the same
environment. 9 At stake was a need to clarify if the prohibition against na-
tional appropriation of spatial areas also extended to the natural resources of
such areas. Also at issue was whether the denial of national appropriation
extended to a denial of property rights to private persons both regarding the
spatial areas and to the natural resources located in such areas.
In examining these problems Brooks argued that prior to the Principles
Treaty the res nullius principle applied to the natural resources of the space
environment and that states, their nationals, and international organizations
could have taken into "exclusive possession" such natural resources."0 The
free exploration and use provisions of Article 1 made it clear that the res
communis principle was to have application to the moon, celestial bodies,
and outer space, per se. The meaning of Article 2 was also interpreted by
Brooks. He began by referring to the view of Jenks, who had relied on
General Assembly Resolution 1721 (XVI), that, "What is forbidden is the
national appropriation of outer space or celestial bodies; the legal regime
applicable to any of their natural resources which it may prove possible to
and profitable to exploit remains for consideration at a later stage in the light
of fuller knowledge of what is practicable and probable."" Brooks was not
overly persuaded by this interpretation. He suggested that the case was not so
clear respecting the use and exploitation of planetary resources without
claiming to appropriate them as was the prohibition against public sov-
ereignty over spatial areas. 2 The debates in COPUOS relating to Articles 1
and 2 of the Principles Treaty indicated that some states considered that there
could not be private property rights in the space environment and to natural
resources located there. 3 On the other hand, other states considered that it
was premature to arrive at a conclusion relating to the rights of states to
establish valid claims to the natural resources of the space environment.
Based on his assessment of the countervailing opinions Brooks concluded
that "the question may still be open. '"" '
"The potential inconsistency between these articles had been noted by the French representa-
tive in COPUOS during the 1966 debates on the treaty. He indicated that it would be necessary
"to decide how far the principle of non-appropriation was compatible with effective exploration
and exploitation, for the same resolutions that forbade the appropriation of celestial bodies
encouraged their use." U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/C/2/SR.57, p. 16. The two articles were consid-
ered to be fully compatible by Secretary of State Rusk. Goldberg, Treaty on Outer Space, op.
cit., p. 110.
"
0Brooks, op. cit., p. 340.
"C. W. JENKS, SPACE LAW, p. 202 (1965).
"2Brooks, op. cit., p. 341.
,'For example, the Belgian representative had stated on August 4, 1966, that "his delegation
had taken note of the interpretation of the term 'non-appropriation' advanced by several delega-
tions-apparently without contradiction-as covering both the establishment of sovereignty
and the creation of titles to property in private law." U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/SR.71 and
Add., p. 7.
"Brooks, op. cit., p. 344.
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The relationship between Article 1 and Article 2 of the Principles Treaty
was described by Ambassador Goldberg as one in which the latter was seen as
"complementing" the former." The complementary relationship was identi-
fied by Brooks when he stated that "since the use of planetary resources is
permitted but national appropriation is not, there is a point at which the use
of a planetary resource becomes appropriation and is forbidden." 5" He
reasoned that appropriation occurs when there is a substantial use of a tangi-
ble resource and when this results in "a significant benefit to a single na-
tion."" Thus, while accepting the total prohibition placed on states, per se,
in Article 2 relating to national appropriation of the space environment, per
se, he accepted the proposition that a state could engage in exploitation pro-
vided the magnitude of the exploitation was not excessive. This would mean
that a lesser account of exploitation of the natural resources of the areas was
permissible when engaged in by a state. Although not stated, presumably
private persons would be entitled at least to the same amount of exploitative
use. Or, they might be allowed unlimited exploitative use of natural resources
since Article 2 referred only to national appropriation and such prohibition
on natural appropriation was limited only to the spatial areas-and not to the
natural resources of such areas.
The suitability of the res communis principle to the use and exploitation of
the natural resources of the moon received much attention by space law ex-
perts prior to the COPUOS negotiations. Ferrer urged the application of this
principle to the natural resources of the moon in the form of "pieces of
celestial bodies."" He regarded such resources as available for "utiliza-
tion. " 9 Szaloky considered that the res communis principle applied to areas
and that they can be "freely used and exploited by anyone." 6 As to natural
resources he stated that "by the act of separation they are endowed with a
separate legal entity. In fact, following the separation they can be taken into
ownership by occupation. Thus, any possible mineral resources, by develop-
ing them, may become subjects of property. They may be processed for trans-
portation. They may be piled up for that purpose."I' Salinas, in more restric-
tive vein, accepted the res communis principle but would have applied it to
the free use by astronauts of resources in situ.6 2
"Goldberg, Treaty on Outer Space, op. cit., p. 21.
"Brooks, op. cit., p. 346.
37d.
I'M. A. Ferrer, Activities on Celestial Bodies Including the Exploitation of Natural Re-
sources, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 12TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 142 (1970).
"Id. at 146.
"
0L. Szaloky, Activities on Celestial Bodies Including the Exploitation of Possible Natural
Resources There, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 12TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 178(1970).
"Id. In his view exploitation under international law would require the promulgation by states
of civil law rules and administrative regulations.
'IT. Salinas, Summary of Discussions, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 12TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF
OUTER SPACE, p. 199 (1970). This view was supported by Fernandez-Brital, Activities on Celes-
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Opposition to the application of the res communis principle to the national
appropriation of the natural resources of the moon was expressed by S. M.
Williams of Argentina. Going beyond the provision of Article 2 of the Princi-
ples Treaty that states should not be able to appropriate the moon and celes-
tial bodies, she rejected the res communis principle when put forward either
by states or by private legal persons respecting both the Moon and its natural
resources. An exception to the foregoing would be allowed respecting natural
resources returned to earth for scientific purposes, which could not be "put
into commerce." 6 Her support for the res communis humanitatis concept
conditioned her willingness to accept the res communis principle. However,
she held that such materials should be shared among states when brought to
earth exclusively for scientific purposes.
Prior to the submission by Argentina on July 3, 1970, of the proposal that
the CHM principle should apply to the natural resources of the moon and
celestial bodies there had been particular support from Argentinian scholars,
led by Professor A. A. Cocca, for the application of the res communis hu-
manitatis concept only to the moon and celestial bodies." It was the view of
Ferrer that the res communis humanitatis concept should be applied to the
moon and to celestial bodies because the acceptance of such an approach
would assure their use for peaceful purposes and for the benefit of human-
ity.6" Salinas also supported the res communis humanitatis concept and ex-
tended it to natural resources. In his view this concept would impose a duty
on a state taking moon rocks into possession to share them with other states
for scientific purposes. 6
Prior to the submission by Argentina of its moon proposal to COPUOS in
1970 scholars were also debating the application of Article 2 of the Principles
Treaty to the appropriation by states and by private legal persons of the
natural resources of the moon and other celestial bodies. Their observations
centered on the explicit prohibition against the national appropriation of the
spatial areas identified as the moon and other celestial bodies. Thus, Ferrer in
accepting the foregoing indicated that Article 2 did not ban "individual ap-
propriation of portions separated" from the moon and celestial bodies. 7 He
noted that, "The use of the common thing implies a kind of appropriation of
tial Bodies, including Exploitation of Natural Resources, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 12TH COLLO-
QUIUM ON THE LAWS OF OUTER SPACE, p. 197 (1970).
"S. M. Williams, Utilization of Meteorites and Celestial Bodies, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 12TH
COLLOQUIUM OF THE LAW ON OUTER SPACE, p. 182 (1970).
"A. A. Cocca, The Principle of the "Common Heritage of All Mankind" as Applied to
Natural Resources from Outer Space and Celestial Bodies, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH COLLO-
QUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 174 (1974).
65Ferrer, op. cit., p. 142 and p. 146. Compare S. M. Williams, The Principle of Non-
Appropriation Concerning Resources of the Moon and Celestial Bodies, PROCEEDINGS OF THE
13TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 157 (1971).
"Salinas, op. cit., p. 199.
"Ferrer, op. cit., p. 146.
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its fragments, so long as, according to their nature, they are susceptible of
such appropriation." 6 8 He also observed that the prohibition against na-
tional appropriation in the sense of claiming national sovereignty did not
countermand the provisions in Article 6 of the Principles Treaty allowing
national exploitative activities. 69
Williams in 1969 made the point that national appropriation of the moon
and celestial bodies would violate Article 2 and supported the position ad-
vanced in 1968 by Brooks that large commercial uses of the moon's resources
would constitute national appropriation.7" However, she acknowledged the
right to engage in exploitation, provided it did not constitute appropriation.7"
She pointed to the post-1967 practices of the United States and of the Soviet
Union. This was viewed as having formed a customary international law
allowing only states to use "in any way they may wish-provided they do not
obstruct other exploring nations-all products from celestial bodies as was
the case before the treaty." 2 On the basis of her distinction between appro-
priation and exploitation, she indicated that even large-scale exploitation of
renewable resources by states would not violate Article 2. While her prefer-
ence was that such exploitation should serve scientific needs, nonetheless she
considered that commercial exploitation-provided it not be so excessive as
to constitute appropriation-was permissible. She supported this conclusion
by expressing the belief that humanity would be the beneficiary. Moreover,
the state producing such benefits was to be allowed to be compensated for the
services rendered." In short, in 1969 she argued against national appropria-
tion of the moon's natural resources, but favored the exploitation of such
resources for both scientific and commercial purposes, provided that the
commercial exploitation was generally limited. However, the exploitation of
renewable natural resources could be unlimited.
Writing in 1970 Williams modified her views by indicating that the appro-
priation of all "space resources is fully banned" when carried out either by
States or by private legal persons." One exception was indicated, namely,




"Brooks, op. cit., p. 346.
"Williams, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 12TH COLLOQUIUM, Op. Cit., p. 183.
72Id.
7"Id. at 183.
"Williams, The Principle of Non-Appropriation Concerning Resources of the Moon and
Celestial Bodies, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 159
(1971).
"Ild. at 158-159. Perhaps it was her view that the exploitation of such resources was permissi-
ble. However, the term used by her was "appropriation." Further, it appears that she favored
such "appropriation" or "exploitation" by both private legal persons as well as by States. This
view of her comments is supported by her general outlook that mankind should benefit from
space activity and from her statement that the 1970 COPUOS proposal of Argentina was consis-
tent with and an elaboration of the 1967 Principles Treaty.
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In 1969 Fernandez-Brital supported the standard view that Article 2 of the
1967 Principles Treaty was a ban on national appropriation of spatial areas.
He also drew a distinction between appropriation and exploitation and urged
that exploitation for the sole purpose of scientific research was mandated by
Article 1, paragraph 1 of the treaty. In his view when natural resources were
returned to earth they should be turned over to an international agency for
equitable distribution among states and for the benefit of humanity in
general. 6
Szaloky, as mentioned above, while referring to the exploitation of areas
seemingly meant to include the natural resources of such areas." His view
that such exploitation was open to "anyone" must be read to include both
private legal persons as well as states. He held that property rights might be
possessed by those who had captured the natural resources of the moon and
celestial bodies.
7 8
Rusconi in 1969 supported the application of the CHM principle to the
natural resources of the moon and other celestial bodies. Rather than consti-
tuting private property such resources, in this commentator's view, were to
"belong to the whole of mankind and they are for their benefit and utility as
their own property." 79 Such materials were to be a "part of a special regime
of property for mankind, who will be able to use them." 8 It was foreseen by
Rusconi that exploitation and use of such resources would be dependent on
an international agreement providing for an international organization able
to license the exploitation of such materials.
Following the promulgation by COPUOS in 1973 of a proposed Draft
Treaty Relating to the Moon,8' which contained the Soviet self-denying pro-
posals relating to property and ownership rights to the surface or subsurface
of the moon, attention was drawn to the rights of private legal persons. This
was viewed by Vassilevskaya as putting "an end to the unrealistic wishes of
separate individuals to somehow acquire portions of the Moon." 82 In com-
menting on the 1973 draft Kopal did not go so far as Vassilevskaya in suggest-
ing that private persons should be prevented from obtaining rights to the
moon or to its natural resources. It was his view that "such activities open
new prospects for mankind as a whole."8 "
"Fernandez-Brital, op. cit., p. 198..
"Szaloky, op. cit., p. 178.
"Id. at 178.
"F. G. Rusconi, Regime of the Property of the Natural Resources of the Moon and Other
Celestial Bodies, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 12TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 186
(1970).
"Id. at 188.
"U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/I 15, April 27, 1973; 1 J. OF SPACE LAW, p. 170, No. 2 (1973).
"E. G. Vassilevskaya, Legal Regulation ofActivities on the Moon for the Cause of Peace and
Progress, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 15TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 178 (1973).
"3V. Kopal, The Development of Legal Arrangements for the Peaceful Uses of the Moon,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 15TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 163 (1973).
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Writing in 1970 Curia added her support to the view advanced by other
Argentinians in support of the res communis humanitatis concept. She con-
sidered the concept to be applicable to both the spatial areas of the moon and
celestial bodies and to their natural resources." Support for the use of such
natural resources on the moon and celestial bodies by cosmonauts was con-
sidered to exist in Article 5 of the 1967 Principles Treaty. She also stated that
it would be lawful for such resources to be returned to earth for commercial
purposes, since their earthly utilization would be for the benefit of mankind.
Thus, the exploitation of such resources for both commercial and scientific
purposes did not constitute a violation of the nonappropriation provision of
Article 2 of the Principles Treaty.8"
Support for the right of private legal persons to engage in commercial
activities relating to natural resources came from Professor Diederiks-
Verschoor in 1971. She visualized the presence of "industrial firms" owning
stations situated on the moon.8 6 In order to formalize the right of states to
allow private parties to have legal rights in natural resources and in the prod-
uct of such resources manufactured by moon laboratories she suggested the
need for suitable international agreements.87
This review indicates that wide-ranging opinions were held by the early
commentators as to the legal status of the moon and celestial bodies and their
natural resources particularly as relating to their appropriation and exploita-
tion. Some considered that such natural resources could be lawfully ex-
ploited; others viewed such activity as an unlawful appropriation. Among
those who favored the legality of exploitation of resources there were some
who reserved this activity to states; others considered such activity to be
lawful when pursued by both states and private legal persons. Some held the
view that such exploitation should be restricted to scientific activity; others
considered that the exploitation might be directed to both scientific and com-
mercial needs. In the minds of some the exploitative activity was sustainable
under the res communis principle. Others preferred the res communis hu-
manitatis approach, while at the same time taking account of the close theo-
retical affinity between such an approach and the emerging characteristics of
the CHM principle. Other commentators rejected these legal principles and
approaches and called for an analogy between exploitative activity on the
continental shelf and the natural resources of the moon and other celestial
bodies. Several commentators considered that the United Nations should be
given governmental and proprietary rights over such resources, while others
"M. T. Curia, Legal and Doctrinary Basis of an International Agreement Concerning Natu-
ral Resources Originating in the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13TH
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 155 (1971).
SId. at 156.
"I. H. Diederiks-Verschoor, Legal Aspects of Laboratories on the Moon, PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 14TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 25 (1972).
I1d.
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expressed the view that there was a need to establish special international
regimes to deal with such resources. These, and other, considerations were to
confront COPUOS when it began to focus on official proposals for a treaty
on the moon and its natural resources in 1970.
In a larger context it is relevant to observe that international law does
contain specific prohibitions against certain forms of conduct, but that in the
absence of such prohibitions both States and other juridical and natural per-
sons are entitled to engage in conduct without its being described as unlawful.
Since Article 2 of the Principles Treaty did not prohibit the private use and
exploitation of natural resources, and since one of the purposes of Article 1
was to allow for the sharing of benefits derived from the exploration and use
of the space environment, it may be concluded that private persons were in
effect encouraged to engage in private space activities. Such conduct would
fit into the expectations fortified by the res communis concept in its joint
application to the conduct of States, international organizations, and private
natural and juridical persons. The absence of any prohibition on the private
use and exploitation of the natural resources of the moon and other celestial
bodies in the Principles Treaty must, therefore, allow such space activity to
take place, unless such activity is prohibited under other norms of interna-
tional law. None appear to exist.
The terms of Article 2 of the Principles Treaty restrict only national appro-
priation of spatial areas. Thus, to the extent that states, pursuant to Article 6
of that Treaty, authorize private legal persons to engage in exploitative activ-
ity regarding the natural resources of such spatial areas, such private activity
would be permissible under both municipal laws and international law. If the
drafters of the Principles Treaty had wished to bar the exploitation of the
natural resources of the moon and other celestial bodies by private legal
persons, or if they had wished to prevent the acquiring of private property
rights in such materials, they could have done so. The fact that such rights to
exploit and to establish property rights in such natural resources were not
specifically granted to private persons cannot serve to deny such claims when
they are put forward. Nonetheless, in the search for legal security it is always
preferable to have reliance on specific grants of authority. This fact in-
fluenced the governments holding membership in COPUOS to begin the
preparation of an international agreement on this subject in 1970.
The Emergence of Concerns for Mankind
By 1970 there was increasing evidence that states must view their long-
range political-legal options from the perspective of an existing world com-
munity. This concept of world relations can be questioned by those whose
perceptions are of a world arena in which a considerably greater latitude is
thought to exist for states as they engage in their search for national self-
interest. Nonetheless, it is abundantly evident that in today's world the most
powerful cannot proceed as they may wish without consulting the outlooks of
other States. A too heavy reliance on certain national-interest policies may be
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counterproductive and regrettably myoptic in the presence of the need for all
states to share in the effective management of world affairs. This includes the
formation of world regimes, including one dealing with the moon and its
natural resources, designed to serve the needs, wants, interests, and values of
mankind at large.
It was in this general context that Ambassador Lodge told the United Na-
tions on September 2, 1958, that the goal of the United States was that "outer
space will be used solely for the benefit of all mankind." In so doing he was
reflecting President Eisenhower's policy statement in which he called upon
states "to promote the peaceful use of space and to utilize the new knowledge
obtainable from space science and technology for the benefit of mankind." 88
This outlook was quickly incorporated into early General Assembly resolu-
tions. Thus, Resolution 1348 of December 13, 1958, Resolution 1472 of De-
cember 12, 1959, and Resolution 1721 of December 20, 1961, proclaimed that
the space environment was to be used in the "common interest of mankind"
and for the "betterment of mankind." 8 Because of this background it was
possible to provide in Article 1 of the 1967 Principles Treaty that "[t]he
exploration and use of outer space including the Moon and other celestial
bodies, shall be carried out for the benefit and in the interests of all countries,
irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific development, and shall
be the province of all mankind." 9 I In testifying before the Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations in connection with the meaning attributed by the nego-
tiators to the term "province of all mankind" Ambassador Goldberg stated
that the U.S. policy relating to the use of the space environment had been
fixed in the 1958 National Aeronautics and Space Act, section 102 (a). It
provided that "activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for
the benefit of all mankind.""' He further stated that "[wie did not believe
that the language is any different 'for the benefit of mankind,' and 'the
province of all mankind.' "92 The negotiators reviewed with care the accep-
"Introduction to Outer Space, An Explanatory Statement by the President's Science Advisory
Committee, p. 1 (1958).
"These and illustrations drawn from other space environment documents, human rights doc-
uments, law of the sea documents, and the 1959 Antarctica Treaty are collected in C. Q. Chris-
tol, The Legal Common Heritage ofMankind: Capturing an Illusive Concept andApplying it to
World Needs, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 18TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 42
(1976). Compare E. Fasan, The Meaning of the Term "Mankind" in Space Legal Language, 2
J. OF SPACE LAW, p. 125, No. 2 (Fall 1974); N. M. Matte, The Draft Treaty on the Moon, Eight
Years Later, 3 ANNALS OF AIR AND SPACE LAw/ANNALES DE DROIT AERIEN ET SPATIAL, p. 531
(1978); S. B. Rosenfield, Solar Energy and "The Common Heritage of Mankind, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE 21ST COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 58 (1979); S. B. Rosenfield, Article
XI of the Draft Moon Treaty, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 22ND COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER
SPACE, in print (1980); E. R. Finch, Jr., 1979 United Nations Moon Treaty Encourages Lunar
Mining and Space Development, Id.; and E. R. Finch, Jr., In Favor of the Moon Treaty, L-5
NEWS, Vol. 4, No. 11, p. 7 (November 1979).
9018 U.S.T. 2410; T.I.A.S. No. 6347; 610 U.N.T.S. 205.
'Pub. L. No. 85-568, 72 Stat. 426.
"
2 Goldberg, "Treaty on Outer Space," op. cit., p. 56.
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tance of the term "province," and, at the instance of the United States, it was
accepted as being the equivalent of "benefit of all mankind." 93 The choice
was influenced by a "discussion of various languages," and it was treated
substantively as "a freedom-of-the-seas provision." 9 The freedom of the
seas principle treats the resources of the seas as res communis, i.e., it allows
for the general exploitation of such resources on an inclusive basis. This
means that exclusive property rights may not be established relating to the
spatial area and to the natural resources located therein. It is totally opposed
to the concept of "patrimony" in the Latin American context of exclusive
property rights.
In Ambassador Goldberg's view Article 2 of the Principles Treaty was
complementary to the province of mankind provisions in Article 1. In his
testimony he observed that Article 2 "is a statement that outer space is not
subject to national appropriation by means of sovereignty, by means of use
or occupation or by any other means, which means that outer space is the
province of mankind." '
It is now well-established that Article 1 and other articles allow for the free
exploration and use of the space environment, and that such space activities
are to serve the general benefits of all mankind. Lest the foregoing meaning
of Article I be misconstrued the Committee on Foreign Relations attached an
understanding respecting it which provided that "nothing in Article 1, Para-
graph 1 of the Treaty diminishes or alters the right of the United States to
determine how it shares the benefits and results of its space activities." 96
The CHM principle, which has been influenced in its development by the
"benefit of mankind," "province of all mankind," and res communis hu-
manitatis concepts, received worldwide attention in 1967 when Ambassador
Arvid Pardo, the representative of Malta to the United Nations, suggested its
applicability to certain ocean areas. This proposal received very broad sup-
port with the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 2749 (XXV) on De-
cember 17, 1970, with 108 States, including the United States, voting for it,
with none opposing, and 14 abstaining. Article 1 of that Declaration pro-
vided that "The sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the
limits of national jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the area), as well as
the resources of the area, are the common heritage of mankind." With the
acceptance of the concept in the several negotiating texts produced by the
Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea from 1976 to the present the




"Executive Report No. 8 to Accompany Ex. D., U.S. Senate, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 4
(1967).
"The respective drafts of the Law of the Sea Treaty have provided that "the Area and its
resources are the common heritage of mankind." The most recent draft is contained in the
"Informal Composite Negotiating Text/Revision I," U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP. 10/Rev. 1,
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that it will become a firmly established principle of the international law of
the sea.
With its acceptance in Articles 11 and 18 of the 1979 Moon Treaty the
principle has applicability to the moon and to its natural resources as particu-
larly defined in that agreement. Article 1 prescribes that the treaty terms
relating to the moon "shall also apply to other celestial bodies within the
solar system, other than the earth, except insofar as specific legal norms enter
into force with respect to any of these celestial bodies. ' 98 Moreover, "refer-
ence to the Moon shall include orbits around or other trajectories to or
around it."" Article 18 specifically refers to the CHM as a "principle."
The Underlying Premises of the
CHM Principle
As noted above, a legal principle is a starting point for legal reasoning. It is
not the function of a principle to provide specific and detailed consequence-
laden requirements. That is the function of rules, and these most frequently
emerge as the principle is applied to practical situations. Nonetheless, those
who are asked to accept a principle having application to their needs, wants,
interests, and values require some understanding and assurance as to the
direction which may be taken by such principles. During the period while the
Moon Treaty has been under negotiation agreement continued to build as to
the meaning of CHM. All the elements of the concept, as it reached the status
of a principle, have application to the exploration and use, including ex-
ploitation, of identifiable natural resources.
The CHM legal principle has its most immediate and prospective applica-
tion in the area of the exploration and use, including exploitation, of natural
resources. Intangible natural resources include the broadcast spectra, orbital
positions, and scientific information. Tangible resources include moon rocks
and other minerals and materials situated on the moon or other celestial
bodies within the solar system, other than the earth.
The CHM principle has notable characteristics. First, it is an enlargement
of the traditional international legal principle of res communis; thereby re-
jecting the res nullius perspective. As such it is just the opposite of the exclu-
sive private property-public sovereignty principle respecting natural re-
sources in their natural condition, e.g., prior to permissible capture, or use,
and exploitation. Second, the principle seeks to benefit niankind generally by
April 28, .1979; 18 Int'l Legal Materials 686 (May 1979). Unlike the Moon Treaty the Law of the
Sea Draft Treaty does not define the spatial area within which the principle is to be applicable.
The world tendency to identify common resources as appertaining to the service of "all human-
ity" is also reflected in the preamble to the 1971 INTELSAT Agreement. 23 U.S.T. 3813,
T.I.A.S. No. 7532.
"U.N. Doc. A/34/20 (1979).
"Id.
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protecting the physical environment against unnecessary degradation. Third,
it endeavors to conserve the world's resources for present and future genera-
tions.'0 0 Fourth, it seeks through agreement to achieve the goal of equitable
allocation of such resources and benefits with particular attention to the
needs of the less-developed countries. This is the essence of the res communis
humanitatus concept. Fifth, it contemplates the presence or formation of an
international regime containing such rules as may be necessary to insure the
realization of the previously identified objectives. If it were to become ap-
parent that a formal governing structure were required to provide for a nor-
mal and structured utilization of the spatial area and its resources, including,
for example, processes for the resolution of disputes, it may be anticipated
that the legal regime would lead to the establishment of a suitable interna-
tional intergovernmental governing body.'0
It must be borne in mind that the CHM principle is the product of a world-
wide awareness of the fact that natural resources are being rapidly depleted.
When the natural distribution of resources was made by nature not all states
and peoples received an equal share of such resources. Thus, there are sub-
stantial political and economic forces at work in support of the distributive
aspects of the CHM principle. Realism must also take into account the fact
that scientific and technological competences are not equally shared among
states, that military capabilities are very disparate, that there are wide ranges
in the respective capacities of states to regulate their own affairs, and that the
demands of some of the less-developed states for a larger sharing in the
world's resources and benefits are abrasively strident.
Further, it has been perceived that all human beings are members of the
human race no matter whether they live in the "North" or the "South,"
whether their loyalties are given to technologically advanced or disadvan-
taged states, and whether their ideologies support the cause of freedom or
' In commenting on the 1973 COPUOS draft Vassilevskaya noted that it contained a new
proposal providing that "due regard to the interests of present and future generations should be
taken into account." Vassilevskaya, op. cit., p. 178 (1973). In commenting on the 1973 draft
Kopal also pointed out the presence of the provision in Article 4 referring to the interests of
present and future generations. Kopal, op. cit., p. 156. While observing that the square-
bracketed provisions of Article 10 of the draft called for the natural resources of the moon to be
treated as the CHM, he considered that "countries conducting expensive explorations of those
areas must be allowed to use reasonable quantities of resources on the spot for different needs of
their exploration activities." Id., p. 163. His observation focused on the practical probability
that states would be able to engage in such exploitative conduct.
'C. Q. Christol, Large Space Systems: Problems and Prospects, PROCEEDINGS, 22d COLLO-
QUIUM ON OUTER SPACE LAW 275 (1980); see also A. A. Cocca, The Principle of the "Common
Heritage of all Mankind" as Applied to Natural Resources from Outer Space and Celestial
Bodies, op. cit., p. 175; M. E. Picarel, Algunas Consideraciones sobre el Producto Lunar,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 12TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 189 (1970). It has been
suggested that the CHM principle also contains those assurances set out in the 1959 Antarctic
Treaty and the 1967 Principles Treaty relating to the communication of information. G. Wolff,
Le Projet de Traite sur la Lune: Sa Place dans l'Evolution du Droit International Public, PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE 16TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 205 (1974).
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statism. Many of the advanced states, for example, have cooperated to ame-
liorate the pressing burdens of poverty in the LDCs, through what is known
as development assistance. This has its foundations in moral concerns, since
the history of mankind has been based on the proposition that the rich and
powerful possess a moral obligation to aid those less favorably endowed. The
sense of sharing has come to be considered as a precurser of a global fairness
revolution. The CHM principle has been influenced by such considerations.
It would be worse than blind to attempt to avoid the impact of such consider-
ations as these when it comes to a meaningful appraisal of the CHM provi-
sions of the Moon Treaty.
Article 11, paragraph 1, following acceptance that "The Moon and its
natural resources are the common heritage of mankind," provides that "its
expression" is to be found "in the provisions of this Agreement and in parti-
cular paragraph 5 of this article."' 2 Paragraph 5 provides:
5. States Parties to this Agreement hereby undertake to establish an interna-
tional regime, including appropriate procedures, to govern the exploitation of the
natural resources of the Moon as such exploitation is about to become feasible. This
provision shall be implemented in accordance with Article XVIII of this Agree-
ment. ,03
Reference is made in Article 11, paragraph 7, to the main purposes of the
international regime to be established to facilitate and govern the exploita-
tion of the moon's natural resources at such time as such exploitation is about
to become feasible. Such main purposes, pursuant to paragraph 7, are:
(a) The orderly and safe development of the natural resources of the moon;
(b) The rational management of those resources;
(c) The expansion of opportunities in the use of those resources;
(d) An equitable sharing by all states parties in the benefits derived from those
resources, whereby the interests and needs of the developing countries as well as the
efforts of those countries which have contributed either directly or indirectly to the
exploration of the moon shall be given special consideration.'
These specifically identified criteria for the application of the CHM princi-
ple to the exploitation of the moon's natural resources are wholly compatible
with the CHM concepts that have been growing since the late 1950s. The
'
2U.N. Doc. A/34/20 (1979).
'
3Article 18 contemplates the revision of the treaty. It articulates procedures, and provides
that "a review conference shall consider the question of the implementation of the provisions of
Article XI, paragraph 5, on the basis of the principle referred to in paragraph I of that article and
taking into account in particular any relevant technological developments."
'
0 Critical of this effort has been Leigh S. Ratiner in testimony before the Subcommittee on
Space Science and Applications of the Committee on Science and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives (September 6, 1979). [Cited hereafter as Ratiner, Statement]. He told the Sub-
committee that "one marvels at the arrogance of those who would even feel qualified to subject
such vastness beyond our understanding and reach to an elaborate legal regime governing future
generations' needs and patterns of growth." Statement, p. 2. However, since 1959 the United
Nations has demonstrated that the space environment is to be used to benefit the needs of earth-
bound humanity. United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, Report
to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/4141, July 14, 1959.
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specific focus given to the CHM principle in the Moon Treaty squares with
the fact that neither states nor private persons can avoid the fact that all live in
an increasingly interdependent world. The CHM principle, as a reflection of
high principles of justice and equity, is a political-legal response to the
world's unequal distribution of resources and human capabilities. It can fa-
cilitate the hope for a sharing of resources. In its ultimate sense the CHM
principle provides guidance in effecting an orderly and equitable distribution
of resources so that a measure of global fairness may be realized. The CHM
principle does not impact upon preferences as to forms and means of
economic organization and production. More specifically the CHM principle
cannot reasonably be considered to be in opposition to the free-enterprise
system of economic and political relationships. Both the free-enterprise and
the socialist states will be able to live very comfortably with the CHM princi-
ple. This result is assured by the provision of Article 11, paragraph 7 (d)
which prescribes that as much special consideration is to be accorded to those
countries "which have contributed either directly or indirectly to the explora-
tion of the Moon" as is to be given to the developing countries.
Pursuant to the terms of the Moon Treaty states following the free-
enterprise system will be beneficially served by the CHM principle. The prin-
ciple will allow for the orderly exploitation of the natural resources of the
moon. This will allow all economic systems to have access to resources and to
derive the benefits flowing from the existence of an understandable legal
regime and prospective governmental structure. As is true with the general
exploitation of resources the practical requirements imposed by the need for
moon resources will ensure the development of a legal regime based on the
mutual self-interest of all concerned.
The Evolution of the CHM Principle
and the Moon Treaty
In order to understand the debate concerning the exploitability of the
moon and its natural resources it is necessary to understand the relevant
differences between sovereignty, jurisdiction, and property. There is the
further need to understand the relationship between public sovereignty and
private ownership and use. A failure to make certain basic distinctions may
produce confusion as to the utility of the CHM principle.'° 5
'"See, for example, the Ratiner statement. Id. See also Arthur M. Dula, Free Enterprise and
the Proposed Moon Treaty, PartL L-5 NEWS, Vol. 4, No. 10, p. 1 (October 1979). For example,
Ratiner refers to such terms as "for the benefit and in the interests of all countries," "sov-
ereignty," and "property" as contained in the 1967 Principles Treaty and in the Moon Treaty as
"catch-phrases." Statement, op. cit., p. 5, fn. His lengthy testimony is given over almost en-
tirely to an assessment of issues before the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea from
the perspective that texts emerging from that conference would result in "special discrimina-
tion" against the advanced states. Id. at p. 8. For a perceptive assessment of the Ratiner state-
ment see W. J. Broad, Earthlings at Odds over Moon Treaty, 205 ScIENCE, p. 915 (November
23, 1979).
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In international law the principle of sovereignty in its most basic sense
allows a State to exercise ultimate authority in a spatial area. Article 2 of the
Principles Treaty denies the presence of national sovereignty in, or national
appropriation of, the space environment consisting of outer space per se, the
moon, and other celestial bodies. Under international law the several princi-
ples of jurisdiction allow a state to exercise authority over persons and events
located both within and outside of the areas in which a state possesses na-
tional sovereignty. 06
In assessing the meaning of the 1979 Moon Treaty it must be remembered
that the 1967 Principles Treaty placed heavy emphasis on freedom for the
exploration and use of the space environment. In the years since 1967 the
earlier interest in acquiring scientific data has been replaced by an era of
practical applications in which the worth of space resources has been particu-
larly identified and where there has been a resultant need to arrive at interna-
tional agreements providing for the orderly exploitation of such resources.
As expectations relating to exploitation were facilitated by scientific suc-
cesses, the need for the development of legal controls became apparent. Such
forces as these have impelled members of COPUOS to agree upon the terms
of the Moon Treaty.
Considerations such as these induced Argentina on July 3, 1970, to submit
to COPUOS a "Draft Agreement on the Principles Governing Activities in
the Use of Natural Resources of the Moon and other Celestial Bodies." In
Article 1, Argentina made the initial proposal for the application of the CHM
principle only to the natural resources of the moon and other celestial bodies,
as opposed to the moon and celestial bodies, per se. The article stated: "The
natural resources of the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be the common
heritage of all mankind."" 7 In Article 2, it was suggested that "[a]ll sub-
stances originating in the Moon or other celestial bodies shall be regarded as
natural resources." 8 However, on March 30, 1973, Argentina submitted a
revised and much enlarged proposal reading "[t]he moon and other celestial
bodies and their natural resources shall be the common heritage of all
mankind." 09
'°These principles are characterized by territorial, nationality, universality, protective, and
passive personality considerations.
"'U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/L.71 and Corr. 1; U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/85, Annex 2, p. 1.
'"Id. This Argentinian initiative was described by Professor A. A. Cocca in Legal Status of
the Natural Resources of the Moon and Other Celestial Boones, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13TH
COLLOQUIUM ON. THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 146 (1971).
9U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/101, p. 6, May 11, 1972; U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/196, Annex 1, p. 13,
April 11, 1977. At the 1973 meeting of the International Institute of Space Law a number of
experts reviewed the status of the draft Moon Treaty. Their articles are published in the PRO-
CEEDINGS OF THE 16TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE: S. Gorove, Property Rights in
Outer Space: Focus on the Proposed Moon Treaty, p. 177; V. Kopal, Legal Questions Relating
to the Draft Treaty Concerning the Moon, p. 180; F. Rusconi and C. Paz-Perina, Proyecto de
Tratado Relativo a la Luna Usos Pacificos y Desarme: Dos Aspectos de una Misma Realidad,
p. 190; L. Szaloky, The Way of the Further Perfection on the Legal Regulation Concerning the
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In the meantime on May 21, 1971, the Soviet Union submitted to the U.N.
a proposed "Treaty Concerning the Moon." " This proposal made no refer-
ence to the CHM concept. Further, it did not mention the terms of Article 2
of the 1967 Principles Treaty which prohibited national appropriation of the
space environment. More specifically, the Soviet proposal did not reject the
existing prohibition against public sovereignty in the space environment. The
Soviet proposal, however, accepted the generally held view that the space
environment was a res communis area. The Soviets focused their attention on
the surface and subsoil of the moon. As to this they sought to prevent the
existence of property rights and ownership. They specifically proposed that
private property rights could not be established on "the surface or subsoil of
the Moon." Thus, Article 8 provided:
(1) Neither States, international intergovernmental or non-governmental or-
ganizations and national organizations having the status of juridical persons or not,
nor natural persons, may claim the surface or subsoil of the Moon as their property.
The emplacement of vehicles or equipment on the surface of the Moon or in the
subsoil thereof, including the construction of installations integrally connected
with the surface or subsoil of the Moon, shall not create a right of ownership over
portions of the surface or subsoil of the Moon.'
In keeping with their focus on the absence of private property rights relating
to the surface or subsoil of the moon the Soviet draft, in Article 8, paragraph
2, proposed that such areas could not become objects of legitimate transfer
because of the nonexistence of property rights. The Soviet proposal was lim-
ited to tangible surface or subsoil areas.
The Soviet proposal was explained by Zhukov in 1971. He stated that while
states, international organizations, national organizations, and other legal
persons could explore and use the moon and its natural resources, such activ-
ity "does not create a right of ownership over the Moon, or over areas of the
surface or its subsoil." ' 2 He indicated that the proposal was intended to
elaborate and define further the terms of the Principles and Astronauts
Treaties, including the prohibiting of military uses on the moon, advancing
the interests of peace, and serving the whole of mankind.
Upon analysis it is clear that the Soviet position was a self-denying one. By
supporting the res communis principle, and by specifically urging that private
property or ownership rights might not be acquired in the surface or subsoil
of the moon, the Soviets were in fact accepting a part of a fundamental
element of the more wide-ranging CHM principle identified above. Their
Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Especially Regarding the Exploitation of Natural Resources
of the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, p. 196.
"'U.N. Doc. A/8391, June 4, 1971.
1 'Id. at 4. This proposal with important changes became Article 11, paragraph 3 of the 1979
Moon Treaty.
"2G. Zhukov, The Legal Regime for the Moon (Problems and Prospects), PROCEEDINGS oF
THE 14TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 50 (1972).
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1971 proposal cannot be interpreted as being in total opposition to the CHM
principle. The Soviet self-denying proposal did not seek to prevent the gath-
ering and use by space-resource states or their nationals of resources existing
on the moon and celestial bodies, which is allowable pursuant to the Princi-
ples Treaty.
Following the 1970 proposal of Argentina and that of the Soviet Union in
1971 the United States on April 13, 1972, submitted a working paper to the
Working Group of COPUOS accepting the Argentinian CHM formulation
in its original form, namely, that "the natural resources of the moon and
other celestial bodies shall be the common heritage of all mankind.". 3 This
formulation was not consistent with General Assembly Resolution 2749
(XXV) of December 17, 1970, which had been supported by the United States
and by the Soviet Union. The latter applied the CHM principle to both the
resources of the area and to the area consisting of the seabed and ocean floor,
and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. Further,
the law of the sea resolution used the present tense "are" rather than "shall
be."
The move for a more extensive application of the CHM concept to both the
moon and other celestial bodies and to their natural resources was initiated by
Egypt and India on April 14, 1972."1' On April 17, 1972, the United States
submitted a new working paper in which it repeated its proposal of April 13
relating to the treatment of the natural resources of the moon and other
celestial bodies as CHM. However, it introduced a provision looking toward
the reality of "the need for economic advancement and for the encourage-
ment of investment and efficient development if there were to be a use of the
resources of the Moon and celestial bodies."" Thus, the United States pro-
posed a future conference at a time proximate to the practical utilization of
such resources. The purpose of such a conference would be to negotiate an
"arrangement for the international sharing of the benefits of such utiliza-
tion." ,6 This proposal was later to find acceptance in Articles 11, paragraph
5, and 18 of the Moon Treaty.
When the Working Group met in 1973 the government of India suggested a
reformulation of the unagreed to 1972 Article 10 on natural resources. Thus,
India proposed a new paragraph 1 of Article 10 to read, "The moon and
other celestial bodies, their subsoil as well as their resources, are the common
heritage of mankind.'"" On March 28, 1973, Iran urged a redrafting of a
"'U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2(Xl)/Working paper 12, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/196, Annex 1,
p. 23, April II, 1977.
'"U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2(Xl)/Working paper, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/196, Annex 1,
p. 23, April 11, 1977.
"'Id. at 23-24.
1161d.
'"U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/101, p. 6, May 11, 1972; U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/196, Annex I, p. 10,
April 1I, 1977.
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preambular part of the draft treaty so as to provide that the moon, as a
natural satellite of the Earth, "constitutes a common heritage of
mankind."' 8
On March 28, 1973 the Soviet Union submitted a lengthy working paper in
which the CHM principle was critically assessed.'" The working paper as-
serted that the concept of "heritage" was merely a philosophical expression
and could not be found in the substance of Soviet civil law. Moreover, it was
argued that only those elements of civil law accepted by the U.S.S.R. could
become a part of international public law. Consequently, the CHM principle
was rejected, since it had its source in the civil law concepts of "inheritance"
and "succession." This dubious and highly mechanistic approach may be
contrasted with the Soviet willingness to accept the "province of all
mankind" principle. It was their view that the "province of all mankind"
principle meant that "celestial bodies are available for the undivided and
common use of all States on Earth, but are not jointly owned by them.""'20
The "province of all mankind" principle was accepted without regard for its
derivation in municipal law or otherwise. It was characterized from the So-
viet perspective as a part of international public law, since it was set forth in
the 1967 Principles Treaty.
The working paper also identified the Soviet view of "ownership," which
was described as "the possession of a thing and the use of it."' 2 The argu-
ment was made that since "ownership" or "property" were a matter of civil
law it was possible to "confirm" their presence in international law by means
of a "universal recognition of the corresponding parts of the civil law of
States in respect of property rights over specific things."' 22
Thus, the Soviet Union indicated that it was willing merely to consider the
application of the common province of all mankind "concept" in the pro-
posed Moon Treaty. It rejected the CHM principle in 1973. This official
position was mirrored in the subsequent writings of Soviet commentators,
who as late as 1977 offered "fierce resistance" to the CHM principle.' 23
Thus, writing in 1977 the Soviet commentator Dekanazov consistently urged
that it would be erroneous to extend civil law concepts bearing on the mean-
ing of CHM to interstate relations. He stated that "[uinder the circumstances
it is ungrounded to speak of the common heritage of mankind as a principle
of contemporary international law, and therefore, any mention of common
heritage as a principle in the Treaty is, to my mind, unacceptable.""'2 In his
"'Id. at I1.
"'U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/196, Annex 1, p. 11, April 11, 1977.
'
2
°Id. at 12. This position agreed with that of Ambassador Goldberg in his testimony on the
Principles Treaty. Goldberg, Treaty on Outer Space, op. cit., p. 56.
"'U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/196, Annex I, p. 12, 11 April 1977.
12"2'd.
"'N. M. Matte, Draft Treaty on the Moon Eight Years Later, op. cit., p. 531 (1978).
'"R. V. Dekanozov, Draft Treaty Relating to the Moon and the Legal Status of its Natural
Resources, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 20TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 198 (1978).
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assessment Dekanozov considered the content of CHM to be the same for
ocean space and the space environment. Dekanozov had previously urged
that the CHM "conception is untenable from the legal point of view. It uses
civil law categories in an arbitrary eclectic fashion without any regard for
established legal realities and brings to mind undesirable associations ... "
like the res omnium communis "notion" which had been "transferred from
the Roman private law into the field of international relations." "' Thus, for
the seabed and the subsoil thereof beyond national jurisdiction, for the ocean
and its superjacent airspace, for Antarctica and its airspace, and for the
moon and other uninhabited celestial bodies, he stated a preference for the
term "an international area (space) for common use."' 26 His objection ex-
tended to the CHM principle, to its application to both the spatial area of the
moon and to its natural resources, and to the linking of the CHM principle to
both the moon and to its natural resources in a single article of the Moon
Treaty. 7 With the anticipated acceptance of the CHM principle in the Moon
Treaty, instead of his plea for "an international area for common use," he
urged that the CHM principle be "interpreted restrictively." 8 This would be
consistent, in his view, with the prohibition contained in Article 2 of the
Principles Treaty, and would allow for the exploitation of the natural re-
sources of the moon "in a manner compatible with the objectives of an in-
ternational regime to be established."'2 9 Initial Soviet opposition to the
CHM principle, which was considered to be closely "connected with the right
of property, possession, and disposition of a thing,"' 30 was based on an
unwillingness to introduce concepts founded in civil law into international
law. Further, there was an unwillingness to "justify the attempts to consider
identical legal problems of the Moon with those of the sea bottom resources
because in many cases they greatly differ and each of them requires a differ-
ent approach."' 3' It was also considered that "the conception of 'common
heritage' suggested by Latin American authors and taken by them from
maritime law is a serious hindrance to the preparation of the Treaty on the
Moon at present."'3
3
'Dekanozov, Relationship between the Status of Outer Space and the Statuses of Areas
Withdrawn from State Sovereignty, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF




7Dekanozov, Juridical Nature of Outer Space Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 17TH COLLOQUIUM OF THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, pp. 200-207
(1975); Dekanozov, Draft Treaty Relating to the Moon and the Legal Status of its Natural




' E. G. Vassilovskaya, Legal Problems of the Exploration of the Moon and Other Planets,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 170 (1974).
1"1Id.
I' E. G. Vassilovskaya, Drawing up a Draft Treaty on the Moon-A Further Contribution to
the Progressive Development of International Space Law, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 19TH COLLO-
QUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 101 (1977).
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In response to the March 28, 1973, Soviet position as to the meaning of the
CHM principle Argentina submitted a working paper on March 30, 1973.'33
It advanced the proposal previously favored by Egypt and India that "[t]he
Moon and other celestial bodies and their natural resources shall be the com-
mon heritage of all mankind." This replaced the more limited scope submit-
ted in the Bulgarian working paper, which contained the text of a draft treaty
consisting of a preamble and 21 articles, based on the text formulated by the
Legal Subcommittee during its pre-1973 sessions, together with certain
changes and amendments. The earlier text would have merely prescribed that
"[t]he natural resources of the Moon and other celestial bodies shall be the
common heritage of all mankind." 3
On April 3, 1973, Italy submitted a five-paragraph draft article on natural
resources which called for the establishment of an international regime
"when such exploitation will become technically feasible." The formation of
such a regime was to be "on the basis of the principle that the natural re-
sources of the Moon are the common heritage of mankind."' 3 5
This was followed by a second working paper of Argentina dated April 17,
1973. 36 Argentina sought to reduce Soviet concerns that the term "heritage"
was essentially philosophical in nature by pointing out that the Spanish
equivalent was patrimonio and that had been used in modern international
law to refer to the "patrimonial sea," namely, territorial waters. The Soviet
position on the relationship between the CHM principle and that of "succes-
sion" was also addressed by Argentina. In its view, succession, as related to
inheritance, was analytically consistent with the root of the concept of in-
heritance, e.g., heritage. Thus, according to Argentina, the whole substan-
tive field of international law relating to state succession was available for
guidance as to the meaning of heritage.
Argentina endeavored to clarify for the Soviets the relationship between
succession and property. Thus, it was pointed out that there were at least two
approaches to the concept of property, namely, ownership rights in property
as represented in eminent domain and also the property aspect of the enjoy-
ment, receipt of the fruits, and profits derivable through ownership. The
Argentinian assessment identified this phase of property as falling within the
domain of beneficial ownership. Further, according to Argentina:
What is one to call this community of ownership, this conjunction of profits, this
joint receipt of fruits and products-in a word, this common property of the moon?
There is no need to create anything new. The idea of heritage-which can even be
intangible-has existed since olden times, and it resolves the issue without major
difficulty. Moreover, international law has always recognized, in addition to sov-
ereignty, a right of ownership on the part of States, which is no different from the
concept of ownership under general law.'"
"'U.N. Doc. 105/196, Annex 1, p. 13, April 11, 1977.
"'U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/115, Annex 1, pp. 11-20 27 April 1973; U. N. Doc. A/AC.105/133,
p. 5, June 6, 1974.
"'U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/196, Annex 1, p. 18, April II, 1977.
"'U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/196, Annex 1, p. 14, April 11, 1977.
'"Id. at 15.
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Argentina indicated that the CHM principle took into account the expecta-
tion that economic profits would be realized, that there would be an equitable
sharing of such profits, that the needs of the LDCs would be taken into
account in the sharing of profits, that this would necessitate the formation of
a suitable international legal regime, and that this might lead to the creation
of either international machinery or an international authority to give effect
to such expectations. It was pointedly observed that the CHM principle had
been accepted as it applied to the ocean in General Assembly Resolution 2749
(XXV) without a dissenting vote. This was construed as "definite proof of
the existence of this legal viewpoint common to all States, entirely irrespec-
tive of their special internal features, their philosophical ideas or their poli-
cies." '3 8
On April 17, 1973, the United States submitted a very specific working
paper concerning the right to the natural resources of the moon and other
celestial bodies. It gave support to the 1971 Soviet proposal insofar as it had
provided that neither the surface or subsoil could be claimed as property.
Thus, the United States suggested that:
Neither the surface nor the subsurface of the Moon or other celestial bodies, nor
any area thereof or natural resources in place, shall become the property of any
State, international intergovernmental or non-governmental organization, na-
tional organization or non-governmental entity or any natural person.'39 (Italics
added)
In commenting on the prospect for the utilization of lunar and planetary
natural resources in the future, while taking into account the prohibition
suggested by the United States in 1973, the General Counsel for NASA, Mr.
S. N. Hosenball, stated that the United States did "not disagree with the
basic principle that all nations should share in the benefits that would accrue
when it becomes commercially feasible to obtain natural resources from the
Moon or other celestial bodies."'' 4 0 At this time in the negotiations some
"'Id. at 16. For an assessment of the Argentinian response to the Soviet interpretation of the
CHM principle see A. A. Cocca, The Principle of the "Common Heritage ofAll Mankind" as
Applied to Natural Resources from Outer Space and Celestial Bodies, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 172 (1974).
"'U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/196, Annex 1, pp. 16-17, 11 April 1977. This proposal, with modest
drafting changes, became the first sentence of Article 11, paragraph 3, of the Moon Treaty. The
terms of paragraph 3, insofar as they make a distinction between in place and not-in-place
resources, can be traced back to the 1970 Argentinian draft agreement. Article 3 of that draft
provided that "The legal system applicable to natural resources used in their place of origin shall
be distinct from that applicable to those brought to the Earth for use." U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/
C.2/L.71 and Corr. .; U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/196, Annex 1, p. 21, April I1, 1977. Support for
such a distinction can be found in the existence of different legal regimes for resources lying
beyond national jurisdiction and those within national territories. A. A. Cocca, Legal Status of
the Natural Resources of the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 13TH
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 148 (1971).
"IS. N. Hosenball, Current Issues of Space Law Before the United Nations, 2 J. SPACE LAW,
p. 9, No. I (Spring 1974).
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states had urged that a moratorium should be placed on the exploration; use,
and exploitation of such natural resources. This view-advanced by the
LDCs-would have prevented exploitative activity until an agreement might
be reached on the allocation of benefits to the LDCs. In indicating the oppo-
sition of the United States to such a moratorium he stated that its net effect
would be "to destroy any incentive for the development of the technology,
either for use experimentally or for its mass production.""
4
'
The 1973 U.S. proposal, by excluding property rights only of "natural
resources in place," naturally would allow for the existence of property rights
for such natural resources not in place or when removed from the original
place. That such natural resources were not to be left forever in place was
reflected in the Argentinian working paper of March 30, 1973, which stated
that "[t]he utilization and development in situ of the natural resources of the
Moon and other celestial bodies, provided that they are undertaken in con-
formity with this Treaty, shall be lawful .... "'" During the negotiations of
the Moon Treaty many states supported the view that the moon's natural
resources in the form of rocks and minerals would be returned to earth.'
3
This right was assured in Article 6, paragraph 2 and in Article 11 of the Moon
Treaty. Such moon minerals have been characterized as constituting "both
an economic, and, in addition, a scientific resource."'"" The United States
also suggested the formation of an international regime to govern the ex-
ploitation of the natural resources of the moon and other celestial bodies
when "such exploitation becomes feasible." 45 Of great importance, the
United States suggested that the proposals of other states denying the crea-
tion of ownership rights should be without prejudice to the proposed interna-
tional regime. Further, such suggested prohibitions on ownership were not to
prejudice the "exploitation of the natural resources of the Moon or other
celestial bodies pending the establishment of such a regime."'"
In the 1973 COPUOS debates the United States indicated that its adoption
of the CHM principle did not constitute either an express or implied prohibi-
tion on the use and exploitation of the natural resources of the moon or other
celestial bodies. The United States contemplated a future international con-
ference at which time it would be agreed that suitable world processes would
be identified for the distribution of CHM benefits. The pendency of the
"'Id. This issue was resolved in paragraphs 3 and 5 of Article I I of the Moon Treaty which
does not make reference to a moratorium and which allows for exploitative activities relating to
natural resources not-in-place.
"'U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/196, Annex I, p. 13.
143id.
"'I. H. Ph. Diederiks-Verschoor and W. P. Gormley, The Future Legal Status of Nongov-
ernmental Entities in Outer Space: Private Individuals and Companies as Subjects and Benefi-
ciaries of International Space Law, 5 J. SPACE LAW, p. 140, Nos. I and 2 (1977).
"'U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/196, Annex 1, p. 17, April II, 1977.
116Id.
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formation of such a regime was not to constitute a prohibition or a morato-
rium on the use of exploitation of natural resources.' 7 However, it was
clearly the position of the United States in 1973 that with the establishment of
such a regime that its function would be to secure the implementation of the
provisions of the CHM principle.
The United States went no further in its 1973 proposal than it had in 1972
relating to the scope of the CHM principle. In 1972 the United States with
respect to natural resources stated that they "shall be" the CHM. In 1973 this
was modified to "are" the CHM. In urging that only the natural resources of
the moon and other celestial bodies should fall within the principle, the
United States also suggested that the CHM principle should not be employed
in such a way as to inhibit the freedom of scientific investigation, including
the right of a state to collect on and remove from the moon samples of its
minerals and other substances. "8
The U.S. proposal accepted the 1971 Soviet draft whereby juridical and
natural persons were not to be allowed to have property or ownership rights
respecting the surface or subsoil of the moon and celestial bodies. Both states
were also committed through the 1967 Principles Treaty not to appropriate
by means of sovereignty or otherwise the moon and celestial bodies. Conse-
quently, both were in agreement that public sovereignty rights were not appli-
cable to the space environment and that private property rights could not be
established respecting the surface or subsurface of the moon, nor any part
thereof nor natural resources in place. 
4 9
By 1976 additional support for the CHM principle had emerged within
COPUOS. Thus, Italy had proposed: "The economic resources of the Moon,
due to be (when) transferred on to the Earth, shall be dealt with as common
heritage of mankind; all States shall have an equal and unhindered access to
them on an equitable basis.""'5 At the same time Italy offered the view that
'H. Reis, Press Release USUN-37 (73), p. 5, April 19, 1973. Mr. Reis represented the United
States on the Legal Subcommittee of COPUOS.
"'This proposed right was set forth in Article 5 of the 1973 COPUOS draft. U.N. Doc. A/
AC.105/115, April 27, 1973. This right was preserved in Article 6, paragraph 2, of the 1979
Moon Treaty.
"'This understanding allowed them to agree on the terms of Article 1I, paragraph 3, of the
1979 Moon Treaty. This provided that "neither the surface nor the subsurface of the Moon, nor
any part thereof or natural resources in place, shall become property of any State, international
intergovernmental or non-governmental organization, national organization or non-
governmental entity or of any natural person." However, this limitation, together with the
others set out in this article were to be without prejudice to the proposed future international
regime. Pending the formation of such a regime the language of paragraph 3 by allowing for the
acquisition of property rights in non-in-place materials has clarified the right of space-resource
States to take possession and control of such materials. Compare S. Gorove, Legal Resources of
the Natural Resources of the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, PROCEEDINGS OF THE 16TH
COLLOQUIUM ON THE LAW OF OUTER SPACE, p. 178 (1974).
"'U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/171, Annex 1, p. 2, May 28, 1976; U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/196, An-
nex I, p. 4, April II, 1977.
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moon resources when transferred to the earth could not appertain to "any
country for its own exclusive economic profit."' 5 ' While the members of
COPUOS welcomed this support for the CHM principle, it is notable that the
Italian submission that would have prevented a state from being entitled to
"exclusive economic profit" was never accepted and forms no part of the
treaty.
In 1976 COPUOS also received a joint working paper from Argentina,
Brazil, Chile, Indonesia, Mexico, Nigeria, Romania, Sierra Leone, and
Venezuela. They urged that "[s]tates Parties undertake to establish an in-
ternational regime governing such exploitation on the basis of the principle
that the Moon and its resources are a common heritage of mankind."" 2
By the close of 1977 the Working Group had arrived at a text based on
informal consultations. They were in agreement that it would be necessary to
establish an international regime governing the exploitation of the natural
resources of the moon when such exploitation were to become feasible. This
agreement, which was to become Article 11, paragraph 5, of the Moon
Treaty, plainly indicated that an international regime was to be established
when exploitation were proven feasible. It did not state that the regime would
have to be established prior to exploitation. Consequently, and consistent
with the expectations developed during the negotiations, exploitation may
take place now. Further, the Working Group were in agreement that the
future regime was to be organized "on the basis of the principle that the
natural resources of the Moon are the common heritage of mankind."' 53
On the basis of the deliberations of the Working Group, and pending the
appearance of the 21-article Austrian Working Paper on April 3, 1978," '
relevant questions were being raised relating to the existing work product of
the negotiations. Among these were: What is the legal meaning to be ac-
corded to CHM? Is it a concept or is it a principle? Does it apply to both
exploration and to exploitation of the moon's natural resources? And,
"What activities would be permitted with regard to the Moon's resources
before an agreed international regime governing exploitation of those re-
sources is established and in force?""' According to Chen:
Certain members considered "common heritage of mankind" as a philosophical
concept lacking legal content which had no place in a legal instrument, while others
maintained that it was a legal concept and a prerequisite for the elaboration of a
'"Id.
"'U.N. Doc. A/AC/171, Annex 1, p. 3, May 28, 1976; U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/1%, Annex 1,
pp. 4-5, April 11, 1977.
"'U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/196, Annex I, p. 19, April 11, 1977.
"U.N. Doc WG.I(1978)/WP.3, 3 April 1978; U.N. Doc A/AC.105/218, Annex I, 13 April
1978.
"'K. Chen, Pending Issues Before the Legal Sub-Committee of the United Nations Commit-
tee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space, 5 J. SPACE LAW, p. 30, Nos. I and 2 (1977).
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treaty relating to the Moon. Some members held the view that activities should be
permitted only for scientific purposes and that no commercial exploitation of the
natural resources should take place before the establishment of the international
regime; others thought that utilization of the Moon and its natural resources should
also be allowed for other experimental purposes; still others were of the opinion
that utilization should be allowed for any peaceful purpose pending the establish-
ment of the international regime." 6
In this scenario there were three central forces at work. There were national
and private wishes to obtain tangible moon resources without upsetting the
provisions of the Principles Treaty. There was the wish by an increasing
number of states that the moon and celestial bodies might be treated as CHM
resources, and this was later amended to include the natural resources of
these areas as being CHM resources. There was also the wish that express
agreement might be reached that natural and juridical persons could not
claim the surface or subsoil of the moon as their property.5 7 The reconcilia-
tion of these competing outlooks reached fruition in Articles 6, 11, and 18 of
the 1979 Moon Treaty.
Article 6 of the Moon Treaty
There was initial support for the right of states, while engaging in scientific
investigations, to collect moon rocks. Article 6, paragraph 2 of the treaty has
used exemplary language authorizing such activities, namely:
In carrying out scientific investigations and in furtherance of the provisions of this
Agreement the States Parties shall have the right to collect on and remove from the
moon samples of its mineral and other substances. Such samples shall remain at the
disposal of those States Parties which caused them to be collected and may be used
by them for scientific purposes. States Parties shall have regard to the desirability of
making a portion of such samples available to other interested States Parties and the
international scientific community for scientific investigation. States Parties may in
the course of scientific investigations also use mineral and other substances of the
moon in quantities appropriate for the support of their missions.",
Without the use of such words as "property" and "ownership" the article
did not interpose inhibitions upon the exclusive use by the space-resource
states of the identified substances. At the same time such states, as a result of
such scientific activity, were not granted a status whereby they might assert
sovereignty over the moon and celestial bodies. Space-resource states were
given specific power to use the identified materials in quantities needed to
engage in the present and immediate need of carrying on scientific investiga-
"'Id. at 30.
"This last assertion was contained in Article 8, paragraph I of the 1971 Soviet draft Treaty
Concerning the Moon.
"'U.N. Doc. A/34/20 (1979).
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tions. Since, over time, the nature and extent of such investigations may be
far-ranging, this provision will allow for very substantial uses of natural
resources.
The fact that Article 6, as well as all of the other articles of the treaty,
contains the term "States Parties," except for Article 1 which is definitional,
does not mean that only states may engage in the exploration and use, includ-
ing the exploitation of the substances and natural resources of the moon.
Article 14 makes it clear that states can act through both "governmental
agencies" and "non-governmental entities." Both governmental and private
endeavors are considered to be national activities. Article 14 is consistent
with Article 6 of the 1967 Principles Treaty. Illustrative of the "States Par-
ties," provisions of the treaty is Article 8 which provides that such parties
"may pursue their activities in the exploration and use of the Moon anywhere
on or below its surface, subject to the provisions of this Agreement."
Article 11 of the Moon Treaty
Article 11 with its focus on the establishment of the CHM principle for
both the moon, including other celestial bodies in the solar system, and its
natural resources was the most difficult to negotiate and contains the most
important provisions in the agreement. This article has been accepted by the
Soviet Union despite its initial nonsupport. The article also adopts the 1971
Soviet proposal denying to juridical or natural persons property or owner-
ship rights in the surface and subsurface of the moon nor any part thereof or
"natural resources in place." The denial of the specified property and owner-
ship rights, namely, exclusive rights, set out in paragraph 3 of Article 11 were,
by the terms of the same paragraph, entered into "without prejudice to the
international regime referred to in paragraph 5 of this article."
Pursuant to paragraph 5 the parties undertake to establish that regime
"including appropriate procedures, to govern the exploitation of the natural
resources of the Moon as such exploitation is about to become feasible." The
treaty allows for exploitation of natural resources. In addition to the forego-
ing provision the preamble of the treaty calls attention to the need to bear in
mind "the benefits which may be derived from the exploitation of the natural
resources of the Moon and other celestial bodies." In response to a sugges-
tion that Article 7, dealing with environmental matters, might be modified as
it related to the CHM principle, COPUOS provided an interpretation, as
follows: "Article VII is not intended to result in prohibiting the exploitation
of natural resources which may be found on celestial bodies other than the
earth, but, rather, that such exploitation will be carried out in such a manner
as to minimize any disruption or adverse effects to the existing balance of the
environment.""' This construction of COPUOS is consistent with the in-
"'U.N. Doc. A/34/20, paragraph 65, p. I1 (1979).
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terpretation provided by Mr. S. N. Hosenball, who served as head of the
U.S. delegation to COPUOS in 1979. He stated to COPUOS on July 3, 1979,
that it was the understanding of that body that the language of Article 7 was
"not intended to be read in such a way as to result in prohibiting exploitation
of natural resources to be found on celestial bodies, but, rather, that any such
exploitation is to be carried out in such a manner as to minimize, so far as
possible, disruption of or adverse changes in the environment." '6 Although
this statement was made in the context of the theme that the CHM principle
seeks to prevent the unnecessary degradation of the physical environment, as
reflected in Article 7 of the Moon Treaty, it also emphasized the prospect of
the lawful exploitation of the natural resources of the moon and other celes-
tial bodies.
Mr. Hosenball told COPUOS that Article 11 made it clear the parties to the
agreement "undertake, as the exploitation of the natural resources of the
celestial bodies other than the Earth is about to become feasible, to convene a
conference to negotiate an international regime to govern the exploitation of
those mineral and other substantive resources which may be found on the
surface or subsurface of a celestial body." 161 He further stated that the terms
of the agreement, which had resulted from many compromises on the part of
COPUOS members, "places no moratorium upon the exploitation of the
natural resources on celestial bodies, pending the establishment of an in-
ternational regime. '62 By not imposing a moratorium on the exploitative
capabilities of the space-resource states it will be possible for them to embark
immediately on experimental activities to be followed by pilot operations as
the realities of the situation may dictate. If during such exploitative opera-
tions it were ascertained that practical gains would be realized, and if there
were a future interest in the formation of the identified regime, he assured the
members of COPUOS that the United States would "make every effort to see
that the regime is successfully negotiated."' 63 He also called attention to the
fact that activities respecting the natural resources of the moon were to con-
form both to Article 11, paragraph 7 dealing with the implementation of the
CHM principle, and Article 6, paragraph 2, dealing with the use of moon
substances for scientific purposes. He drew the conclusion that these provi-
sions made it clear that the "right to collect samples of natural resources is
not infringed upon and that there is no limit upon the right of States parties to
utilize, in the course of scientific investigations, such quantities of those natu-
ral resources found on celestial bodies as are appropriate for the support of
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their missions. We believe that this, in combination with the experimental
and pilot programs, will foster and further, and perhaps speed up, the possi-




Just as an infant creeps before it crawls, and crawls before it walks which is its
form of exploiting the surface on which it is engaged in these respective forms
of movement, so also a state or its nationals will be exploiting the natural
resources of the moon in the course of their experimental activity, pilot plant
operations, and full-scale operational and use activities. Thus, the central
strategy behind these provisions was to allow for exploitative activity despite
an awareness of the fact that there would be extraordinary costs involved in
returning substantial amounts of such resources to earth.
The United States was also interested in identifying the relationship be-
tween the 1967 Principles Treaty and the Moon Treaty. The Principles Treaty
assures the free use of the space environment and access to it subject to basic
limitations. The Moon Treaty makes provision for the exploitation of the
moon's natural resources as well as exploration and use after they have been
taken into possession. Thus, the Moon Treaty, in keeping with the general
tenor of the Principles Treaty, assures uses subject to conditions. In this
context Mr. Hosenball stated:
In regard to the matter of the Moon treaty's relation to the 1967 Outer Space
Treaty, discussions in the Committee resulted in no statements to the effect that the
Moon treaty is intended to weaken in any way the provisions of the 1967 Treaty. In
this light, and taking into account the last two preambular paragraphs of the Moon
treaty, there was a feeling that a non-derogation provision would be superfluous.
Our delegation accepted this view, and has joined in the consensus on the Moon
treaty with the understanding that it in no way derogates from or limits the provi-
sions of the 1967 Outer Space Treaty. 6
Following Mr. Hosenball's statement the Soviet representative at CO-
PUOS, Mr. Kolossov, stated that his government had been optimistic con-
cerning the achievement of consensus on the draft Moon Treaty. While he
observed that the Soviet Union would "make no hasty interpretation of the
meaning behind each article of the new draft agreement,"' 66 he did not raise
any objection to the interpretations previously made by the U.S. representa-
tive.
In a prepared statement before the House Subcommittee on Space Science
and Applications on September 6, 1979, Mr. Hosenball provided additional
information relating to the manner in which the Moon Treaty had achieved
consensus in COPUOS.' 61 He stated that the exact formulation of the CHM
1641d.
16Id. at 26.
"66U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.203, pp. 43-45, 16 July 1979.
"'S. N. Hosenball, Statement, Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications, Committee
on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, September 6, 1979 [cited hereafter
as "Statement"].
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principle as it related to the exploitation of natural resources had caused the
greatest difficulty to the negotiators. At the end of the Legal Subcommittee's
negotiations in April 1978, the relevant draft of Article 11 provided:
1. For the purposes of this Agreement, the Moon and its natural resources shall
be considered the common heritage of mankind, which finds its expression in the
relevant provisions of this Agreement and in particular in paragraph 5 of this arti-
cle.' 6'
During the 1979 meeting of the Legal Subcommittee the government of Brazil
suggested that the foregoing might read:
1. The Moon and its natural resources are the common heritage of mankind,
which finds its expression in the provisions of this [Agreement] [Treaty] and in
particular in paragraph 5 of this article.'69
Consensus was obtained in COPUOS on the Brazilian formulation of Article
11. Mr. Hosenball advised the House Subcommittee that this resulted from
acceptance by the Soviet Union and by the agreement on the part of the
developing countries "not to insist on a provision imposing a moratorium on
the exploitation of natural resources pending the establishment of an interna-
tional regime to govern such exploitation."' 70
In his testimony he took some pains to point out that although the CHM
principle had been established in Article 11, paragraph 1, that it was tied to
the establishment of a future international regime, and that a process for
dealing with such negotiations appeared in Article 18 of the treaty. He also
developed at some length the open and public commitment of the United
States during the early 1970s to the proposition that the natural resources of
the moon and celestial bodies should be governed by the CHM principle. 7 '
This documentation clearly identified the negotiating strategy of the
United States in which it had sought to preserve the guarantees contained in
the 1967 Principles Treaty relating to free exploration, use, and access to the
space environment. During the 1972 and 1973 outer space negotiations the
issue of the imposition of a moratorium on outer space use and exploitation
had been raised. This position had been advanced by the group of developing
nations that had introduced the same proposal for a moratorium respecting
deep seabed resources before the General Assembly of the United Nations
and which had secured the adoption of General Assembly Resolution 2750C
(XXV) on December 17, 1970, by a vote of 108 in favor, 7 against, and 11
abstentions. The United States opposed a moratorium respecting exploration
and use of both space and ocean resources. As to the former, Mr. Hosenball
"'U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/218, Annex 1, p. 6, April 13, 1978.
"'U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/240, Annex 3, p. 5, April 10, 1979.
'"Hosenball, "Statement," op. cit., pp. 6-7.
"'Id., pp. 8-14.
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reminded the members of the Subcommittee, that in 1973 COPUOS had been
advised that:
The United States is not prepared to accept an express or implied prohibition on
the exploitation of possible natural resources before the international conference
meets and agrees on appropriate machinery and procedures and a treaty containing
them takes effect. In our view, the Moon agreement cannot reasonably seek to
require that exploitation must await the establishment of the treaty-based regime. "2
He also referred to the U.S. working paper presented to COPUOS on
April 17, 1973,'" in which it had been indicated that the concept of a prere-
gime moratorium had been excluded. The U.S. had stated in 1973 that:
As is apparent from the text, this working paper excludes the concept of a prere-
gime moratorium. References to the words "in place" in the first sentence of that
paragraph [2] and to paragraph 7 of Article X make this clear. More particularly,
the words "in place" in the first sentence of paragraph 2 are intended to indicate
that the prohibition against assertion of property rights would not apply to natural
resources once reduced to possession through exploitation either in the pre-regime
period or, subject to the rules and procedures that a regime would constitute, fol-
lowing the establishment of the regime."'
Mr. Hosenball told the Subcommittee in 1979 that the above statements
"were not contradicted and constituted a part of the legislative history of the
treaty negotiations."" The legislative history of the drafting of an interna-
tional agreement will, of necessity, provide the foundation upon which the
interpretive process rests. When the terms of the Moon Treaty are connected
with the statements constituting the legislative history, it should be clear that
the treaty seeks to assure that exploratory and exploitative activities will be
encouraged. The transition from experimental to pilot programs, and from
pilot programs to commercial activity can be forecast. This activity is permis-
sible to determine the feasibility of further exploitation. Once this has been
demonstrated, the proposed regime can be negotiated. From the point of
view of the free-enterprise system the moon agreement will allow for the
planned, orderly and legally controlled space activities. Thus, the treaty is
clearly consistent with the 1967 Principles Treaty. The Soviet-proposed re-
strictions against property or ownership rights on the surface or subsurface
of the moon are conditioned by the U.S. sponsored "in place" requirement.
This forestalls a limitation on a free-enterprise system. It was the purpose of
the United States in amending the Soviet proposal by adding the term "in
place" to make sure that the prohibition against the assertion of property
rights would not apply to moon rocks and other natural resources when they
1'1d., pp. 10-11.
'U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2(XI)/Working Paper 15, U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/196, Annex 1,
p. 16, April Ii, 1977.
"'Quoted by Hosenball, "Statement," op. cit., p. 11, Article X of the 1973 draft became
Article I I of the 1979 Moon Treaty.
1111d.
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were reduced to the possession of the exploiter. At that time the exploiter
would be using something that had been acquired, and it would not constitute
either a property right or an ownership right in the surface or subsurface of
the moon. Once materials on the surface or derived from the subsurface had
been taken into possession or acquired they are no longer "in place." No
advantage would be derived by the acquirer or possessor if the materials were
to be left in place. Only by their movement and their subsequent utilization
could they have value to the acquirer. As pointed out above there is a real and
important distinction between the right to acquire and use a movable re-
source and fixed property or ownership rights-enabling an owner to exclude
all others from an identifiable spatial area. The gathering of a moon rock or
of lunar substances for use is the substantial equivalent of the harvesting of a
living resource in the ocean. The Moon Treaty preserved this distinction by
denying property or ownership rights to the natural resources of the moon or
celestial bodies only so long as such resources remain in place. The treaty,
furthermore, is internally consistent on this point. Article 11, paragraph 8, by
referring to Article 6, paragraph 2, has used words making it clear that there
is a right to collect mineral samples in connection with scientific investiga-
tions and that such substances and other natural resources may be used by the
collector for scientific purposes. This position was reflected by Mr. Hosen-
ball in his July 1979 statement to COPUOS.'7 6 The other members of
COPUOS did not disavow this interpretation. He also brought this aspect of
negotiations to the attention of the House Subcommittee.1
7
In his appearance before the House Subcommittee Mr. Hosenball also
recounted the negotiating history as it related to the spatial application of the
CHM principle. He noted that in the 1979 COPUOS Report it would be
pointed out that the Committee was in agreement that "by virtue of Article I,
paragraph 1, the principle contained in Article XI, paragraph 1, would also
apply to celestial bodies in the solar system other than the Earth and its
natural resources."' 7' Article 1, paragraph I reads: "The provisions of this
Agreement relating to the Moon shall also apply to other celestial bodies
within the solar system, other than the Earth, except insofar as specific legal
norms enter into force with respect to any of these celestial bodies." Mr.
Hosenball stated that "the plain meaning of this Committee agreement is to
limit application of the 'common heritage' principle to the celestial bodies
themselves and to the natural resources of such celestial bodies.' 17 9 Continu-
ing with this assessment of the spatial application of the CHM principle, he
stated in his next sentence, "Clearly, there is no intent to apply the principle
'16U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.203, p. 22, July 16, 1979.
"'Hosenball, "Statement," op. cit., pp. 12-13.
"'Id. at 13. The 1979 Report of COPUOS does contain the foregoing words. U.N. Doc. A/
34/20, paragraph 62, p. 11 (1979).
"'Hosenball, "Statement," op. cit., p. 13.
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to orbits and trajectories of space objects." 8 This observation must be ex-
amined from the perspective of the language of paragraph 2 of Article 1
which states that "[flor the purpose of this Agreement reference to the Moon
shall include orbits around or other trajectories to or around it." This means
that the CHM principle applies to moon orbits and trajectories. This follows
from the language of Article 11 applying the CHM principle to the moon and
to its natural resources and the language of Article 1, paragraph 2, pursuant
to which the moon is defined to include orbits around or other trajectories to
or around it. Thus, Mr. Hosenball's observation identifying the spatial non-
applicability of the CHM principle means only that the CHM principle does
not apply to orbits around the earth.
The need for clarification as to the spatial coverage of the CHM principle
was acknowledged by Mr. Hosenball when he made a statement for the rec-
ord on July 3, 1979, at COPUOS. He identified the U.S. understanding of the
Article's meaning as follows:
We accept the Committee's conclusion as to this Article-namely, first, that
references to the Moon are intended to be references also to other celestial bodies,
other than the Earth; secondly, that references to the Moon's natural resources are
intended to comprehend those natural resources to be found on these celestial
bodies; and thirdly, that the trajectories and orbits referred to in Article I, para-
graph 2 do not include trajectories and orbits of space objects in Earth orbit only, or
trajectories of space objects between the Earth and Earth orbit.
In regard to the phase "Earth orbit only," the fact that a space object in Earth
orbit also is in orbit around the Sun does not bring the space objects which are only
in Earth orbit within the scope of this treaty; and a space object orbiting the Moon,
while the Moon orbits the Earth as well as the Sun, is in fact within the scope of this
treaty.' 8'
This interpretation was received with approval by COPUOS. Thus, the
1979 COPUOS report has recorded that the Committee was in agreement
that "the trajectories and orbits mentioned in Article I, paragraph 2, do not
include trajectories and orbits of space objects in Earth orbits only and tra-
jectories of space objects between the Earth and such orbits.'" ' In short, the
acceptance of the CHM principle in the proposed Moon Treaty does not deal
with earth orbits and trajectories only. Thus, the Moon Treaty will not have
any application to the process of ascending into earth orbit or remaining in
such an orbit. Since this use of the space environment has been and will
continue to be the space activity having the greatest political, economic, and
military value it is hard to see, either at the present or even in the future, how
the proposed treaty will present any threat to the free-enterprise system in
these exploitable areas.
As has been pointed out the CHM principle encompasses the concept of the
sharing of benefits produced by the space-resource states with those states
18-1d.
".'Id. at 13-14; U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.203, pp. 25-26, July 16, 1979.
"'U.N. Doc. A/34/20, paragraph 63, p. 11 (1979).
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still in the process of development. Since the advanced states have risked their
resources in hazardous, space activities, there has been a natural wish on
their, and for their nationals, part to recoup their investments and to obtain
profits as well as to be of assistance to states still in a developmental condi-
tion. Thus, a discussion of the distribution of benefits will be an ongoing one,
with many new proposals still to be heard as to sharing. In his review of the
Moon Treaty negotiations Mr. Hosenball pointed out there was "nothing in
the text [that] suggests that all countries are to share equally in the Moon's
resources." ,83 He also stated:
Any sharing of resources would have to be agreed to in an international con-
ference. Article XI, paragraph 7, uses the phrase "equitable," not "equal"
sharing. In determining "equitable" sharing, special consideration is to be given
not only to the needs and interests of the developing countries but also to "the
efforts of those countries which have contributed either directly or indirectly to the
exploration of the Moon.' 8 ,
This language, which is an accurate paraphrase of Article 11, paragraph 7
(d), is consistent with other international formulas seeking to effect a distri-
bution of natural resources. For example, Article 33, paragraph 2, of the
1973 International Telecommunication Convention provides that radio fre-
quencies and the geostationary satellite orbit must be so used as to enable
countries or groups of countries to "have equitable access to both . . ac-
cording to their needs and the technical facilities at their disposal." 8, This
formula has allowed for a satisfactory forum for the negotiation of compet-
ing claims. It may be expected that paragraph 7 (d) will allow for a suitable
blending of the respective claims of states for an equitable share of CHM
resources.
Consistent with and supporting the foregoing analysis was the statement of
Ambassador R.W. Petree to the General Assembly's Special Political Com-
mittee on November 1, 1979. (Press release, USUN-107 (79), November 1,
1979.) He reemphasized the fact that consensus diplomacy had produced an
agreement that enhanced the opportunities of states and defined juridical and
natural persons to engage in space activities, including the exploration, use
and exploitation of the moon and its natural resources. He stated that the
Moon Treaty was consistent with the 1967 Principles Treaty, that the former
did not derogate from the latter, that the Moon Treaty did not provide for a
moratorium on exploitative activities, and that there was a compatibility
between the provisions allowing for scientific and commercial activity re-
specting the moon and its natural resources.
Following specific reference to Article 6, paragraph 2, dealing with the
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Article 11, paragraph 7, identifying CHM objectives, as "providing both a
framework and an incentive for exploitation of natural resources of celestial
bodies," (Id., p. 7.) he stated that:
They constitute a framework because even exploitation which is undertaken by a
State Party to the Treaty, or its national outside of the context of any such regime,
either because the exploitation occurs before a regime is negotiated or because a
particular State may not participate in the international regime once it is es-
tablished, will have to be compatible with those purposes set forth in Article 11,
paragraph 7 of the Moon Treaty.
The same paragraph also is an incentive. By setting forth now the purposes gov-
erning exploitation of natural resources, uncertainty is decreased and both States
and private entities may now find it possible to engage in the arduous and expensive
efforts necessary if exploitation of the natural resources of the celestial bodies is
ever to become a reality. (Id.)
Following other equally informed expressions by representatives of other
states the Special Political Committee submitted the Moon Treaty to the
General Assembly for its approval. When the matter came before the General
Assembly on December 5, 1979, the Moon Treaty was approved without a
formal vote. (U.N. Doc. A/34/PV.89, December 10, 1979.) The Moon
Treaty was thereupon referred by the Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions to the member states for signature and for ratification in accordance
with their constitutional requirements. As they engage in their respective
deliberations they will give special consideration to fact that the agreement
allows for the exploitation of the moon and its natural resources.
The Campaign against an Effective Legal
Regime in the Space Environment
In the short time since COPUOS gave its approval to the Moon Treaty
several U.S. commentators, who have played a role in the identification of
policy as it may relate to the use and exploitation of ocean resources, have
evidenced their concern as to certain Treaty terms by asserting that the CHM
principle violates the concept of free enterprise. It had been quite evident
among the members of COPUOS that at the same time that they had been
determining the applicability of the CHM principle to the moon and to its
natural resources that the delegates to the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea were analyzing the same concept. For example, the
Austrian representative during the 1979 debates on the Moon Treaty stated
that "[slome delegations have informally indicated the special difficulty
which arises from the fact that the notion of the common heritage of
mankind is also at the center of the Law of the Sea negotiations."' 86
"'U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/PV.191, p. 13, June 19, 1979. A U.S. representative has observed
that "the negotiations in the U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea with respect to an interna-
tional authority for mining manganese nodules on the deep seabed beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction, have so sensitized the international community that many of the less-developed
countries have sought to bring basic elements of the seabed authority being negotiated into the
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It is true that the Group of 77 circulated a text on August 16, 1974, at the
Law of the Sea negotiations, which read: "The area and its resources being
the common heritage of mankind, the title to the area and its resources and all
other rights in the resources are vested in the Authority on behalf of mankind
as a whole. These resources are not subject to alienation." However, by 1976
the Law of the Sea negotiators had rejected this proposal and had not or-
dained that such resources were to be "vested" in the proposed authority.
Further, all of the Law of the Sea texts from 1975 down to the present have
provided that "[tihe Area and its resources are the common heritage of
mankind."' 87
Resistance to the formation of an orderly legal regime for the exploitation
and use of the moon and its natural resources has rejuvenated the same objec-
tions that have been made regarding the establishment of an orderly legal
process for the exploitation and use of the manganese nodules lying on the
deep seabed and ocean floor. In each instance it has been suggested that the
acceptance of the CHM principle would in some manner deny to the scientifi-
cally and technologically advanced states and their nationals the prospect of
successful exploitation and use.
It has been evident that the critics of the CHM principle possess preferred
policy outlooks. In general terms they are opposed to regulation of almost
any kind, and particularly a regulatory process that is international in charac-
ter.' 88 While, in principle, they are not friendly to national controls, these
would be acceptable in preference to other forms of governance, and particu-
larly if national control could be blended with a considerable amount of
national protections and benefits. It is possible that by launching an attack on
the CHM principle as identified in the Moon Treaty an effort has been made
to seek to discredit the CHM principle as it may ultimately be contained in a
Law of the Sea international agreement.
The early attacks on the Moon Treaty in the United States raise four issues.
There has been an effort to demonstrate that the language of the treaty, and
the purposes attempted to be achieved by such language, had been misinter-
preted by the principal U.S. negotiator in his statements to COPUOS and to
the House Subcommittee on Space Science and Applications on September 6,
1979. In particular, it has been alleged that the United States has agreed to a
moratorium on the exploitation of the natural resources of the moon. '89 It
prospective moon treaty." H. Reis, International Space Law, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Space Science and Applications of the Comm. on Science and Technology, U.S. House of
Representatives, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess., p. 31 (1976).
"'U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8/Rev./Part 1; U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.l,
April 28, 1979. For an analysis of the development of the CHM principle in both the Law of the
Sea negotiations and the negotiations for a Moon Treaty down to July 1976, see, C. Q. Christol,
International Space Law, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Space Science andApplications of
the Comm. on Science and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess.,
pp. 2-17 (1976).
.'Ratiner, "Statement," op. cit., p. 12.
"'Ratiner, "Statement," op. cit., p. 7 and pp. 13-14.
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has also been asserted that Mr. Hosenball's comment on the meaning of the
"in place" provision of Article 11, paragraph 3, cannot be supported.
Second, there has been an effort to demonstrate that a consistent position
exists between the Soviet Union and the less-developed countries, and that
they somehow can find support in the Moon Treaty to prevent the United
States or its authorized nationals from engaging in the exploitation of the
indicated natural resources. Third, there has been an attempt to use the lan-
guage of the proposed treaty to demonstrate that supporters of the free-
enterprise system will not embark on the required investments either because
of the prospect that there will be an international legal regime at some future
date or because of the absence of such a regime at the present time. Finally, by
failing to examine analytically the nature and purpose of the negotiations
there has been an unfortunate tendency to grasp at the presumable literal
meaning of words without taking into account the gloss applied to them
during the extended diplomacy of consensus.
The allegation that the principal U.S. negotiator has misinterpreted the
meaning of the treaty as it relates to a moratorium on the exploitation of the
moon's natural resources is particularly unfortunate. As stated above the
United States has consistently opposed the thought that there should be a
moratorium on the exploitation of both moon and deep seabed resources. To
be inconsistent on this issue would weaken the total policy position of the
United States. The purpose and intent of the Moon Treaty, as well as its
language in Article 11 and in Article 18, is to allow for the present exploita-
tion of moon resources. It is only the establishment of the international re-
gime that is to await exploitation-which exploitation in a physical sense
would be expected to be more limited at the beginning than later. The regime
is to follow the exploitation-not the exploitation to follow the regime. Since
there is no specific provision in the treaty providing for a moratorium, since
some states at one time endeavored to introduce the language of moratorium
into the negotiations, since their efforts were rebuffed, since the chief U.S.
negotiator has categorically indicated that no moratorium existed, and in
view of the fact that this statement was not denied in COPUOS, it would
appear that the only way that those who wish to read a moratorium into the
agreement can do so is by way of implication. While it is not unusual to
receive arguments premised on inference, this approach does not have merit
in this situation for the foregoing reasons. Additionally, it would be inconsis-
tent to identify the "exploitation of the natural resources of the Moon and
other celestial bodies" as a purpose of the treaty as set out in the treaty
preamble, and then attempt to establish only on the basis of inference the
presence of a major limitation on the desired result. Further, the environmen-
tal protections contained in Article 7 were understood by COPUOS, accord-
ing to the uncontroverted statement of Mr. Hosenball, to mean that this
Article was "not intended to be read in such a way as to result in prohibiting
the exploitation of natural resources to be found on celestial bodies but,
rather, that any such exploitation is to be carried out in such a manner as to
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minimize, so far as possible, disruptive of or adverse changes in the environ-
ment."' 90 This language contemplates a present exploitation, and this is
hardly in keeping with a moratorium.
Some confusion seemingly has arisen in the minds of critics of the provi-
sion in Article 11, paragraph 3 that "[n]either the surface nor the subsurface
of the Moon, nor any part thereof or natural resources in place, shall become
property . .. ." Members of COPUOS in agreeing to the foregoing language
sought to eliminate the original Soviet proposal of 1971 whereby the Soviet
Union endeavored to prevent juridical and natural persons from claiming
"the surface or subsoil of the Moon as their property."' 9' This would have
been a total prohibition against property rights and ownership. When the
United States urged the inclusion of the words "in place" the U.S. represen-
tative stated that these words were intended "to indicate that the prohibition
against ascertation of property rights would not apply to natural resources
once reduced to possession through exploitation either in the preregime pe-
riod, or, subject to the rules and procedures that a regime would constitute,
following the establishment of the regime."' 92 The terms of Article 11, para-
graph 3 are clearly intended to allow for exploitation upon the taking of
possession of such items. This is not the language of moratorium.
A second attack has been made on the meaning of the treaty as reflected in
its negotiation and as explained both by COPUOS in its formally drafted
commentary on the treaty'93 and by the essentially identical language of the
principal U.S. negotiator. It has been made to appear by some commentators
that the terms of the treaty and the indicated COPUOS and U.S. interpreta-
tions are still subject to the willingness of the Soviet Union and the less-
developed countries to accept the foregoing views. '9" In principle it is difficult
to understand how such Soviet and Third World views, even if contrary to
those just identified, would negate such interpretations and thereby deny to
the United States and its authorized nationals the right to begin exploitative
activities. Further, since the United States and the Soviet Union as major
space-resource states have common interests in exploitative activities, it is
more likely that their common interests will support common exploitative
efforts. At the present time there is no evidence that they will pose objections
to exploitative activities.
"'U.N. Doc. A/AC. 105/PV.203, pp. 23-25, July 16, 1979. Italics added to indicate that this is
a present right.
"'U.N. Doc. A/8391, Article 8, paragraph 1, June 4, 1971.
"'Hosenball, "Statement," op. cit., p. 11.
"'U.N. Doc. A/34/20, paragraphs 55-66, pp. 10-12 (1979).
"4For example, it has been imagined that "it is clear beyond reasonable doubt that the
U.S.S.R. and its supporters in COPUOS have and are executing a careful and deliberate pro-
gram intended to limit the entry of free enterprise into space." Arthur M. Dula, Free Enterprise
and the Proposed Moon Treaty, Part II, L-5 NEWS, Vol. 4, No. I1, p. 7 (November 1979). The
law and practice evolving from the 1967 Principles Treaty clearly denies success to such a ma-
neuver.
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A third criticism of the Moon Treaty is that it is hostile to those states which
are based on the free-enterprise system. More particularly, it has been as-
serted that investors domiciled in private-enterprise countries will be reluc-
tant to engage in exploitative activities pending further clarification of the
enterpriser's right to profit from the use of that technology. 95 This outlook,
if valid, could impose constraints on future exploitative activity. However,
the international legal order that has emerged particularly since the accep-
tance of the 1967 Principles Treaty by about 80 countries, including all of the
space-resource states, has patently made provision for free use of and access
into the space environment. The Moon Treaty is not designed to turn the
clock back on this major achievement. Rather, the treaty, through the estab-
lishment of legal rights and duties, has sought to normalize and regularize the
rights to exploit the particular resources identified in the treaty.
While the acceptance of the CHM principle in the treaty may require the
sharing of some of the benefits realized from the exploitative process, this
cannot be treated as a device to eliminate the profits earned through the
taking of risks under the free-enterprise system. In the minds of many the
clarification of the international legal regime allowing for such exploitative
activity will encourage rather than restrict both the free-enterprise and other
economic systems to engage in economically viable space activity. Unlike the
present provision in the 1979 Law of the Sea Negotiating Text, which calls for
the establishment of a carefully structured institution for the management of
the manganese nodule resource, the Moon Treaty contains no comparable
provisions. The Moon Treaty simply contemplates that a suitable regime is to
be formed at a future date depending on the then present scientific facts
pertaining to the full exploitability of the natural resources of the moon.
Finally, there has been a disposition on the part of the critics of the treaty to
read its terms only in a highly restrictive and essentially literal sense. One
illustration is the attempt to identify the meaning of the terms "scientific
investigation" and "scientific investigations" as they appear in Article 6,
paragraph 2 in an artificial and limited way. 96 Since these expressions do not
exclude the inherent elements of research and developments as a part of such
scientific inquiry, no good reason appears to exist to assert that research and
development having the purpose of advancing scientific investigation may
not be permissible. Since scientific investigations have resulted in commercial
products-as in the United States space program-it is not likely that the
United States and other states that have benefited from such activities will be
heard to argue that scientific investigation must be divorced from modern
technology and consumer benefits.
If there are valid criticisms to the Moon Treaty they do not include those
just identified. The nature of the world's political-legal preferences are such
"'Ratiner, "Statement," op. cit., pp. 13-14.
"'Dula, op. cit., p. 5.
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that mere apprehensions as to the application of the CHM principle in the
workaday world provide no valid basis for objection to the most recent con-
sensus conclusions of COPUOS. The political-legal base accorded to the
CHM principle through the consensus diplomacy of COPUOS will allow for
the lawful exploitation of the natural resources of the moon and other celes-
tial bodies. The other terms of the treaty will also contribute to the realization
of important values in the space environment by all states and their nationals.
A somewhat different form of criticism, which although raised and ap-
parently disposed of by COPUOS, continues to be directed toward the lack
of a formal definition of CHM in the treaty. This form of criticism comes
from those who, when confronted by innovative terms such as mankind or
CHM, seek to advance a definition of a concept or of an idea. In this connec-
tion it should be kept in mind that while definitions may be suitable for a
specific object, having, for example, tangible qualities, or for private rela-
tionships, as in a contract situation, the utility of endeavoring to define a
principle may be questioned. It is generally acknowledged that principles do
not lend themselves readily to definitional labels. The latter serve as arbitrary
limitations on growth and destory the usefulness of principles.
Nonetheless, some policy purposes may be advanced by those who are
imbued with a definitional propensity. For example, it may be imagined that
through a definition it would be possible to achieve a degree of present speci-
ficity, with this being regarded as a suitable value. Unfortunately, for this
perspective the history of the law has demonstrated that words have a habit of
changing their meanings. As a result a definitional fetish may produce deep-
seated frustrations.
In the search for the anticipated security of a present definition, and in the
absence of experience as to how the concept or principle has actually func-
tioned, there have been complaints raised as to the novelty, generality, philo-
sophical underpinnings-as opposed to legal-and the uncertain historical
pedigree of the challenged concept. Other false guidelines have been refer-
ences to the literal meaning ascribed to the indicated term on the basis of a
reference to a dictionary. Flawing such definitional efforts have been failures
to recognize that such concepts frequently possess the quality of creative
principles with the essential quality of starting points for legal reasoning.
Such definitional approaches may contribute more to the obscuring of goals
than to providing guidance in the use of the yet unperfected and unexplored
concept. In short, such definitional approaches may serve more to prevent
the gathering of practical meaning than to enhance it.
Another enemy of the legal principle is provincialism. This occurs when an
effort is made to fashion an understanding of what is new from a limited
experience with the municipal law that is dominant in a given state. A wider
parochialism has occurred when an attempt is made to impose on a new
concept, such as that of "mankind," meanings which have their roots only
within a given legal system.
When such inelastic definitional and provincial biases are put aside an
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opportunity then is afforded to seek to understand the function of such
words and expressions and to put utilitarian meanings into the new ideas.
This can result in the identification of suitable components, and agreement
can be reached as to their relevance and worth. Further, they can be tested in
practical situations to determine if they are delivering a political-legal prod-
uct worthy of acceptance and retention.
In the international law of the space environment what has been said has
particular application to the "common interest of mankind" as set out in
General Assembly Resolution 1742 (XIV), the "province of all mankind" as
contained in Article 1 of the 1967 Principles Treaty, and the CHM principle
as accepted in Article 11 of the Moon Treaty. From the context of space uses
and activities and through an understanding of the purposes to be served by
the international law of the space environment, it will be possible to deter-
mine the meaning of such concepts and principles. From this perspective the
condition, identified as the " 'mankind' syndrome,"' 9' offers considerable
guidance to juridical and natural persons in the formulation of procedures
and practices allowing for the orderly exploration, use, and exploitation of
the moon and its natural resources. Giving substance to the CHM concept
and allowing for its utilitarian use for the benefit of juridical and natural
persons are Articles 6, 8, 11, and 18 of the Moon Treaty. They, when read in
the light of the Moon Treaty negotiations, provide suitable and adequate
guidance to the implementation of the CHM principle.
Conclusion
The Moon Treaty, like all of the other space environment treaties follow-
ing the 1967 Principles Treaty, fortifies and extends certain critical provisions
of the latter. The Moon Treaty has made a most important contribution to
the clarification of international space law by reemphasizing the principle
that the moon is not subject to sovereign appropriation. By comparison,
however, the treaty makes provision for the exercise of property and owner-
ship rights respecting those natural resources that have been removed from
the surface or the subsurface of the moon. Thus, provision is made for the
exploration and use of the moon and its natural resources, including their
exploitation for commercial purposes as well as for scientific purposes. The
exploitation for commercial purposes is made subject to the fact that the
moon and its natural resources are the CHM.
The Moon Treaty goes beyond making a distinction between the nonexer-
cise of national sovereignty and the existence of public and private property
rights. As to property rights the treaty prevents the acquisition of property
rights to spatial areas such as the moon. It also specifically prohibits the
acquisition of property rights in the surface or subsurface of the moon and to
natural resources in place. Thus, the treaty allows for exploitation by both
"'A. Bueckling, The Strategy of Semantics and the "Mankind Provisions" of the Space
Treaty, 7 J. SPACE LAW 15 (1977).
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public and private legal persons of natural resources that have been reduced
to possession by the act of removing them from their original in place loca-
tion. Once such materials and resources are no longer in place the possessor
may maintain proprietary rights. The treaty in taking cognizance of the emer-
gence of such exploitative activity has provided for a subsequent convening
of an international conference to formulate a regime whereby larger and
more extensive exploitation activities will be brought within the CHM princi-
ple. The treaty does not impose a moratorium on such exploitative activity
nor on the acquisition of property rights with regard to such natural resources
pending the convening of the identified conference.
During the negotiation of the terms of the Moon Treaty, lasting from the
Argentinian original proposal in 1970 to July 1979, particular difficulties
were encountered in reaching consensus on the use and exploitation of natu-
ral resources, on limits to be imposed on ownership and property rights, and
the CHM principle. During the decade of negotiations a variety of views was
put forward on these subjects by legal authorities and by COPUOS partici-
pants. The negotiations were marked by many innovative suggestions and by
a willingness of the commentators and negotiators to modify positions ini-
tially favored.
Originally the Soviet Union was opposed to the CHM principle. Further,
Soviet spokesmen initially objected to the right of private legal persons to
engage in exploitative activity relating to the natural resources of the moon.
The less-developed countries periodically urged the view that there should be
a moratorium on the exploitation of the moon's natural resources. They also
supported the view that such resources, if they were to be used, should be
used only on the surface of the moon. At the outset there was sentiment in
favor of applying the CHM principle only to the moon, but not to its natural
resources. During the drafting period some states urged that the moon's
natural resources should be used only for scientific purposes. At the end all of
these positions had been abandoned and affirmative provisions are contained
in the treaty allowing for the use and exploitation of the moon and its natural
resources pursuant to the CHM principle and for both scientific and commer-
cial purposes. Such use and exploitation of natural resources by public and
private legal persons, as has been emphasized, is limited to resources no
longer in place. The reason for this limitation is not to prevent such exploita-
tion and use but rather is intended to assure that there not be claims to sov-
ereign rights to the surface or subsurface of the moon as a result of such
exploitative activity. By allowing for the indicated exploitative activity the
Moon Treaty conforms to the underyling thesis of the 1967 Principles Treaty
that the space environment should be explored and used and that access to the
area for peaceful uses and activities should not be restricted.
During the negotiations a number of suggestions were put forward that
would have produced legal consequences for human activity on the moon. It
was suggested that the moon and its natural resources should be given a
continental shelf status. Some scholars favored giving the U.N. public sov-
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ereignty and private property rights over the Moon and its natural resources.
Others would have denied the entire possibility of obtaining legal title to the
moon's materials and resources. Others would have rejected the traditional
res communis principle, and Professor Cocca would have enlarged and ex-
tended the res communis principles through acceptance of the res communis
humanitatis concept. While the latter proposal has a close affinity with the
CHM principle, all of the other proposals did not survive the assessments of
the commentators and the COPUOS negotiations.
Articles 6, 8, 11, and 18, as well as the preamble, are most directly relevant
to the use and exploitation of the moon. Articles 6, in assuring the freedom of
scientific investigation, refers to the collection, use, and removal of moon
samples or its mineral and other substances. It does not use the terms found in
Article 11, namely, natural resources. Article 6 by guaranteeing the freedom
of scientific investigation does not restrict human activity exclusively to sci-
entific activity. By allowing for the use of such mineral and other substances
in support of man's missions on the moon it is clear that the treaty contem-
plates the presence of human activity more extensive than scientific inquiry.
This article does not deny the use of the moon and its natural resources for
other activities. Moreover, by encouraging scientific activity this article lays
the foundation for the more advanced exploitation contemplated in Articles
1 I and 18. Article 8 identifies where exploitative activity may take place,
namely, on or below the surface of the moon.
Article 11, by providing that the CHM principle appertains to the moon
and to its natural resources, advances the international law of the space en-
vironment well beyond the terms of the 1967 Principles Treaty. The CHM
principle is consistent with the provisions of Article 2 of the Principles Treaty
preventing the sovereign appropriation of the space environment. The CHM
principle takes account of the need of states and peoples to utilize natural
resources for their general well-being in an era in which natural resources are
in increasing demand. The CHM principle is identified in detail in Article I I
so that those who are engaged in exploitative activities will understand the
nature of their rights and duties as they make use of the indicated natural
resources. States that become bound by the Moon Treaty will, pursuant to
Article 18, be obliged to work out a more detailed international regime for the
governance of the moon and the larger exploitation of its resources over time.
States will be expected to adopt national legislation whereby they will comply
with the international standards fixed in Article I 1 and in any subsequent
requirements formulated by the future regime. The treaty's provisions specif-
ically enable both public and private legal persons-without regard for the
national social-political structure of any state-presently to engage in ex-
ploitative activities. The treaty is neither biased for or against states or-
ganized upon a free-enterprise or a socialist preference. It does not prohibit
exploitation pending the establishment of the future regime.
In its present form the Moon Treaty is designed to assist in the exploration,
use, and exploitation of the moon and its natural resources. All of the mem-
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bers of COPUOS, industrial states and LDCs alike, perceive that through the
CHM principle exploitation is now permissible. They are also aware that over
time there is a probability that the economic and scientific benefits of ex-
ploitation and use will be maximized.
The Moon Treaty is a affirmative step toward insuring that exploitation
and use will take place in an orderly manner under applicable international
law. The outcome will be more than an orderly structure for the exploitation
and use of the moon and its natural resources. There will also be, pursuant to
the CHM principle, an orderly process for the sharing of the benefits derived
from the exploitation and use of increasingly important resources. Such
sharing, as the treaty explicitly provides, is to be based on equitable consider-
ations. This does not mean that there will be equal sharings. Those who have
taken the risks of exploitative activity will still be allowed to realize the bene-
fits flowing from their initiatives, enterprise, and successes. Pursuant to the
spirit underlying the treaty all mankind will be the ultimate beneficiaries. 9 8
'"Following the approval by the United Nations General Assembly of the Treaty on December
5, 1979, it was opened for signature and ratification. By September 15, 1980 the treaty had
entered into force for Chile, France, Romania, The Philippines, Austria, and Morocco. United
Nations Document A/RES/34/68, 14 Dec. 1979; 18 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1434 (1979).

